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McKoski: Disfavoring Justice

DISFAVORING JUSTICE
Raymond J. McKoski*

Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson agreed on very little. They
did agree, however, that the institutional legitimacy of the courts depends
on public confidence in the judiciary. Hamilton famously stated, “[c]ourts
have neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment. If the public does not
have confidence in courts' judgment, then the legitimacy of courts as a
democratic institution is endangered.”1 Less famously, Jefferson wrote to
Supreme Court Justice William Johnson that confidence in the judiciary
is not only “desirable to the judges” but also “important to the cement of
the union.”2
The overarching principal that “[j]ustice must be rooted in confidence”
thrives today.3 The courts, organized bar, and independent law-related
organizations all recognize the importance of enhancing public trust in
the judiciary.4 Of course, opinions vary on how to build public confidence
in the judiciary. The most successful efforts are those that remedy system
deficiencies that the public, the organized bar, law professors, the press,

* Circuit Judge (retired), Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois. Judge McKoski is an Adjunct
Professor at The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois.
1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 522-23 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961).
2. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (Oct. 27, 1822), quoted in DONALD G.
MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON, THE FIRST DISSENTER 169 (1954).
3. Metro. Props. Co. (FGC) v. Lannon, [1969] 1 Q.B. 577, 598 (“Justice must be rooted in
confidence, and confidence is destroyed when right-minded people go away thinking: ‘The judge was
biased.’”).
4. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1666 (2015) (“We have recognized the ‘vital
state interest’ in safeguarding ‘public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the nation's elected
judges.’”) (quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 889 (2009)); Republican Party of
Minn. v. White, 336 U.S. 765, 817-18 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (finding a compelling state interest
in preserving public confidence in the judiciary); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
867-68 (2002) (acknowledging that the Court hesitated to overrule Roe v. Wade in part because a reversal
of Roe would undermine public faith in the institutional legitimacy of the Court and the public’s
acceptance of the Court’s decisions on controversial issues); Aharon Barak, Forward: A Judge on
Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 59 (2002) (“[A]nother
essential condition for realizing the judicial role is public confidence in the judge.”); Jessica Conser,
Comment, Achievement of Judicial Effectiveness Through Limits on Judicial Independence: A
Comparative Approach, 31 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 255, 256 (2005) (“The paramount state objective
is public confidence in the judicial system . . . .”); NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PUBLIC TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM, NATIONAL ACTION PLAN: A GUIDE FOR STATE AND NATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 6 (2002) (sponsored by the American Bar Association, Conference of Chief Justices,
Conference of State Court Administrators; League of Women Voters, and National Center for State
Courts), http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/ctcomm/id/20 (describing one purpose
of the conference as “identifying the issues, strategies, and plans for addressing public trust and confidence
in the judiciary”).
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and the judiciary view as inimical to a fair and just legal system.5 Jefferson
identified such a consensus evil when he observed that judges, may not
only be tempted by bribery, but may be “misled by favor, by relationship,
by a spirit of party, by a devotion to the Executive or Legislative[.]” 6
Special treatment for favored individuals is condemned by all segments
of the public as well as the legal profession.7 Indeed, since 1789, every
federal judge has taken an oath to shun favoritism.8 But in spite of their
oaths and the uniform condemnation of dispensing favors, judges
continue to blatantly misuse their power and prestige to secure special
treatment for family, friends, political supporters, former clients, and a
multitude of others in court proceedings, police investigations, and other
matters.9 Each time a judge bestows a favor, public trust suffers. The
Arizona Supreme Court observed that “[n]othing threatens public
confidence in the courts and the legal system more than a judge who
abuses his power and exploits the prestige of his office for personal
benefit.”10
5. Unfortunately, whether judges should be selected by election or appointment dominates the
discussion on the best method to increase public confidence in the judicial system. See Roy A. Schotland,
Comment, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 150 (1996) (“[O]ne would hardly suspect that more sweat
and ink have been spent on getting rid of judicial elections than on any other single subject in the history
of American law.”). But building public trust cannot be based on proposals that implicate partisan
interests. And the selection of judges has been a partisan issue since Hamilton and Jefferson chose sides
in the dispute. Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 529 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961)
(opposing the popular election of judges because “there would be too great a disposition to consult
popularity, to justify a reliance that nothing would be consulted but the [C]onstitution and the laws”), with
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (September 28, 1820), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 161 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1899) (“When the legislative or executive functionaries
act unconstitutionally, they are responsible to the people in their elective capacity. The exemption of the
judges from that is quite dangerous enough. I know no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the
society but the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control
with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion by
education.”).
6. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abbe Arnoux (July 19, 1789), National Archives, Founders
Online, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-15-02-0275.
7. See infra Part II.E.
8. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 8, 1 Stat. 73, 76. The oath currently taken by federal judges
proceeds:
I, ____ ____, do solemnly swear or affirm, that I will administer justice
without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I
will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon
me as ____, according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to
the constitution, and laws of the United States. So help me God.
28 U.S.C.A. § 453 (2017); see also In re Justin, 809 N.W.2d 126, 137 (Mich. 2012) (finding
that a judge’s use of power for personal benefit is inconsistent with his oath and “deleterious
to the integrity and honor of the judiciary”).
9. See infra Part III.
10. In re Abrams, 257 P.3d 167, 174 (Ariz. 2011) (en banc).
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Judges abuse the power and prestige of office in countless ways. For
example, some judges invoke their positions and titles to solicit
contributions for charities,11 to advance political candidates and causes,12
and to promote private financial interests.13 This article examines the most
insidious form of the abuse of judicial office—the intervention of judges
in adjudicatory and investigatory proceedings to affect favorable
outcomes for themselves, family, and friends. The misuse of judicial
power and prestige to confer this type of benefit severely damages public
confidence in the courts by creating a two-tier justice system, one for
“connected” people and another for everyone else.14
Inexplicably, lawyers, judges, and scholars have given scant attention
to eliminating the abuse of judicial power and prestige. That oversight
may be because discussing ticket-fixing, for example, is not as
intellectually satisfying as joining the fray over the interplay between
judicial independence and judicial accountability in the context of judicial
selection methods. It may also be that judges and judicial disciplinary
commissions do not recognize the serious consequences when judges
abuse their office to assist “special people.” Or it may be that the legal
profession does not want to end a judicial career simply because a judge
calls a jail and demands the immediate release of a friend.15 But most
likely, curtailing the misuse of judicial power and prestige receives little
attention due to a lack of understanding why judges, who should know
better, continue to violate long-standing, unambiguous ethical
prohibitions against employing governmental power to further private
interests.
Part II of this Article establishes that since 1924, each American Bar
Association (ABA) Model Code of Judicial Conduct has specifically and
expressly prohibited judges from using judicial power and prestige for
anything other than official business. For example, the 2007 ABA Model
Code of Judicial Conduct provides: “[a] judge shall not abuse the prestige
of judicial office to advance the personal or economic interests of the
11. See, e.g., In re McNulty, Determination (N.Y. Comm'n on Judicial Conduct Mar. 16, 2007);
see also RAYMOND J. MCKOSKI, JUDGES IN STREET CLOTHES: ACTING ETHICALLY OFF-THE-BENCH 16264 (2017) (describing instances of judges misusing the prestige of office by directly soliciting funds for
charitable organizations).
12. See, e.g., In re Kamins, Stipulation (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Sept. 9, 2014) (stating
that Judge Kamins “lent the prestige of his position to secure positive media coverage and endorsements”
for a district attorney candidate); In re Glickstein, 620 So. 2d 1000, 1002-03 (Fla. 1993) (reprimanding a
judge for writing a letter on official letterhead to a newspaper editor endorsing another judge for retention).
13. See, e.g., In re Laatsch, 727 N.W.2d 488, 491 (Wis. 2007) (reprimanding a judge for
identifying himself as a judge in a Yellow Pages advertisement for his private law practice).
14. See infra Part II.E.
15. See, e.g., In re Petrucell, Public Censure (Cal. Comm’n on Judicial Performance (Aug. 27,
2015); see also infra Part V.B. (noting the hesitancy of judicial disciplinary commissions to permanently
or temporarily remove judges from office for the misuse of judicial power and prestige).
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judge or others, or allow others to do so.”16 Because every jurisdiction
patterns its code of judicial conduct after one the ABA models, and each
code includes an unambiguous rule barring the exploitation of the judicial
office, no judge can claim ignorance of their ethical obligation. Part II
further explains the public policy behind the unwavering efforts of the
drafters of judicial codes to emphasize the importance of reserving
judicial power and prestige for official purposes.17 Part III demonstrates
the seemingly perpetual misuse of judicial power and prestige by judges
to advance purely private interests.18 Part III also focuses on attempts by
state judges to obtain favorable treatment in matters pending in court and
matters under investigation by law enforcement officials for themselves,
family, friends, co-workers, former clients, politicians, and friends of
friends.19 For example, ticket-fixing by judges is the quid essential
illustration of this form of corruption. Part IV investigates the following
potential explanations for a judge’s misuse of office: quid pro quo
arrangements; ignorance, incompetence, and stupidity; narcissism;
confusion of morality roles; and the most convincing explanation, an
over-developed sense of entitlement.20 Part V suggests ways to reduce the
misuse of judicial power and prestige, including education, meaningful
discipline for offending judges, and addressing the sense of entitlement
that permeates the thinking of judges who abuse their governmental
positions.21
II.

THE ABA MODEL CODE PROVISIONS GOVERNING THE MISUSE OF
JUDICIAL POWER AND PRESTIGE

Judicial conduct codes specifically prohibit the misuse of judicial
power and prestige because the drafters of the codes recognize that such
misconduct has an especially devastating effect on the public’s faith in
the impartiality and integrity of the judiciary.22 Another reason why
judicial codes call special attention to the abuse of the judicial office is
simply that lawyers write the codes and lawyers often suffer the adverse
consequences when a judge exploits his or her authority. As a result, each
of the four ABA Model Codes of Judicial Conduct repeatedly warns
16. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.3 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2007).
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part III.
19. See id.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part V.
22. See Comparison of Jurisdictional Codes of Judicial Conduct to Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, ABA Center for Professional Responsibility Policy Implementation Comm. (May 14, 2018)
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/judicial_ethics_regulation/co
mparison.html.
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judges to confine their use of judicial power and prestige to official
duties.23
A. The ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics (1924)
The ABA’s first model judicial code admonished judges to avoid even
the appearance that their official actions were influenced by “kinship,
rank, position, or influence of any party or other person.”24 The 1924
Canons of Judicial Ethics (1924 Canons) further specified that a judge
should not use the power or prestige of office to: (1) promote the business
ventures of the judge or a third party; (2) persuade others to patronize the
judge’s or a third party’s private business ventures; or (3) secure
contributions to the judge’s favorite charity. 25 Canon 26 advised judges
to refrain from investments that might arouse suspicions that a special
business relationship “warp[ed] or bias[ed] his judgment.”26 Similarly,
judges were advised to avoid the appearance that social relationships or
friendships influenced judicial conduct.27 To prevent the “suspicion of
being warped by political bias,” the 1924 Canons cautioned judges against
promoting the interests of a political party, making political speeches,
endorsing candidates, and making political contributions.28 Canon 30
further protected judicial integrity and impartiality from political taint by
advising that a judge running for a judicial office should refrain from any
conduct that “might tend to arouse reasonable suspicion that he is using
the power and prestige of his judicial office to promote his candidacy or
the success of his party.”29 Neither could a judge who maintained a private
law practice “utilize his judicial position to further his professional
success.”30 Finally, to make the prohibition crystal clear, the 1924 Canons
cautioned judges not to administer the judicial office “for the purpose of
advancing his personal ambitions or increasing popularity.” 31 Fifteen
years after the adoption of the 1924 Canons, the ABA Committee on
Professional Ethics and Grievances succinctly summarized the
importance of the prohibition against the abuse of judicial power and
prestige:
23. Every state’s code of judicial conduct is based on one or more of the ABA Model Codes. See
Dana Ann Remus, Just Conduct: Regulating Bench-Bar Relationships, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 123,
139 (2011).
24. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 13 (Am. Bar. Ass’n 1924).
25. Id. Canon 25.
26. Id. Canon 26.
27. Id. Canon 33.
28. Id. Canon 28.
29. Id. Canon 30.
30. Id. Canon 31.
31. Id. Canon 34.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

5

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 2

422

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 87

[t]he judicial office is one of great power. The action of a court may
vitally affect the life, the liberty, the property, and the happiness of
any person subject to its jurisdiction. The judicial power should be
used only as an instrument to accomplish the due administration of
justice. It should never be used or seem to be used to advance either
the private or political welfare of the person holding the judicial
office.32
Although by 1945 only eleven states had adopted the 1924 Canons,33
most states eventually enacted some version of the ABA’s first judicial
code.34 Notwithstanding that the ABA intended the Canons to serve only
as aspirational guidelines, many states made the Canons mandatory and
enforceable.35 In those states, the Canons often provided the basis for
disciplining judges who misused judicial power and prestige to advance
their own or another’s private interests.36
B. The ABA Code of Judicial Conduct (1972)
The new ABA Code of Judicial Conduct (1972 Code) emphasized the
importance of avoiding the misuse of judicial power and prestige in
several ways. First, unlike the purely aspirational 1924 Canons, the 1972
Code was mandatory and enforceable.37 Second, the 1972 Code continued
many of the specific prohibitions against the exploitation of the judicial
office found in the predecessor Canons. For instance, the new Code barred
32. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances Formal Op. 193 (1939).
33. Republican Party of Minn. v. White 536 U.S.765, 786 (2002) (quoting JOHN P. MACKENZIE,
THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE 191 (1974)).
34. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Preface (Am. Bar Ass’n 1972) (“Those [1924] Canons . . . have
been adopted in most states.”); see also Katherine A. Moerke, Must More Speech be the Solution to
Harmful Speech? Judicial Elections After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 48 S.D. L. REV. 262,
266 (2003) (“Forty-three states adopted some version of the 1924 Canons.”).
35. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Impartial Judge: Detachment or Passion?, 45 DEPAUL L. REV.
605, 606 (1996) (stating that although the 1924 Canons were adopted by a number of states, they were
seldom enforced).
36. See, e.g., Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. Franco, 151 N.E. 17, 30-31 (Ohio 1958) (disciplining
a judge for using the power and prestige of judicial office to promote his own candidacy for prosecuting
attorney in violation of Canon 30); In re Vasser, 382 A.2d 1114, 1116-17 (N.J. 1978) (finding that using
judicial stationery to promote a private law practice violated Canon 31); In re Jenkins, 419 P.2d 618, 621
(Ore. 1966) (en banc) (finding that a judge violated Canons 13 and 29 by using his office to benefit himself
and his wife); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Heitzler, 291 N.E.2d 477, 484-85 (Ohio 1972) (disciplining a judge
in part for allowing a corporation to use the judge’s position as a board member to promote its business);
Bartlett v. Enea, 359 N.Y.S.2d 364, 366-67 (App. Div. 1974) (removing a judge for arranging the
dismissal of traffic tickets issued to his daughter’s father-in-law and others in violation of Canons 4, 13,
and 34).
37. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Preface (Am. Bar Ass’n 1972) (“The canons and text establish
mandatory standards unless otherwise indicated.”).
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a judge from soliciting funds for educational, religious, charitable,
fraternal, and civic organizations, or permitting the use of his judicial
prestige for such purpose.38 Similarly, Canon 5C(1) prohibited a judge
from exploiting his prestige in business and financial dealings. 39 Third,
and most importantly, the drafters of the 1972 Code designed Canon 2B
to broadly address the problem of judges dispensing or seeking favorable
treatment for family and friends. Canon 2B provided that a judge should
not “permit family, social, or other relationships” to influence the exercise
of judicial power.40 Canon 2B also protected against the misuse of judicial
prestige by unambiguously41 stating “[a judge] should not lend the
prestige of his office to advance the private interests of others; nor should
he convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a
special position to influence him.”42 The drafters of the 1972 Code
believed that this latter provision would prevent the judicial office from
being “prostituted” to advance private interests.43
Courts applied Canon 2B of the 1972 Code to a wide array of judicial
misconduct. Pennsylvania disciplined a judge for his attempt to dissuade
a district attorney from instituting criminal charges against two of the
judge’s friends.44 The Washington Supreme Court relied on Canon 2B in
disciplining a judge for advising a supervising probation officer that if the
probation officer wanted the judge’s continued support he must promote
the judge’s girlfriend.45 Judicial disciplinary bodies also invoked Canon
2B in cases in which judges advised police officers of their judicial status
to avoid traffic citations,46 in other “run-of-the-mill” ticket-fixing cases,47
and in less blatantly improper contacts with other judges before whom a
relative was scheduled to appear.48 In In re Klein, the New York
38. Id. Canon 5B(2) (“A judge should not solicit funds for any educational, religious, charitable,
fraternal, or civic organization, or use or permit the use of the prestige of his office for that purpose . . .
.”).
39. Id. Canon 5C(1) (“A judge should refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to . .
. exploit his judicial position.”).
40. Id. Canon 2B.
41. Dixon v. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 393 N.E.2d 441, 442 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1979)
(Jasen, J., dissenting) (describing the demands of Canon 2B as “unambiguous”).
42. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B (Am. Bar Ass’n 1972). While Canon 2B provided that
a judge should not lend judicial prestige to advance the interests of others, others included the judge. The
1990 ABA Model Code corrected the inartful wording. See infra Part II.C.
43. E. WAYNE THODE, REPORTER’S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 49 (1973).
44. Judicial Inquiry and Review Bd. v. Fink, 532 A.2d 358, 365, 373 (Pa. 1987).
45. In re Deming, 736 P.2d 639, 654 (Wash. 1987) (en banc).
46. See, e.g., In re Collester, 599 A.2d 1275, 1277-78 (N.J. 1992).
47. See, e.g., In re Inquiry Concerning a J. No. 1035, 361 S.E.2d 157, 158 (Ga. 1987); In re Miller,
572 P.2d 896, 896 (Kan. 1977).
48. In re Harned, 357 N.W.2d 300, 301-02 (Iowa 1984); see also Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory
Comm. Op. 81-8 (1981) (advising that a judge may not use judicial stationery to write letters of complaint
to automobile dealers and utility companies).
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Commission on Judicial Conduct found that a judge violated Canon 2 by
introducing a friend to other judges for the purpose of increasing the
friend’s chance of obtaining court-appointed receiverships.49
C. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct (1990)
With a few minor changes, the 1990 ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct (1990 Code) retained the substance of Canon 2B of the 1972
Code.50 Canon 2B of the 1990 Code introduced gender neutral language,
replaced “should not lend,” with “shall not lend,” and clarified that judges
were prohibited from lending prestige to their own private interests as
well as to private interests of third parties.51 It also added “political”
associations to the list of relationships that a judge should not let influence
judicial decisions. Thus, Canon 2B of the 1990 Code provided in pertinent
part:
[a] judge shall not allow family, social, political or other
relationships to influence the judge’s judicial conduct or judgment.
A judge shall not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the
private interests of the judge or others; nor shall a judge convey or
permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special
position to influence the judge.52
Likely because of the inexplicable frequency with which judges
violated old Canon 2B by intervening on behalf of family and friends in
legal matters, the drafting committee of the 1990 Code found it necessary
to illustrate several common ways in which judges misuse the power and
prestige of office. First, the Commentary to Canon 2 of the 1990 Code
stated the obvious: “[i]t would be improper for a judge to allude to his or
her judgeship to gain a personal advantage such as deferential treatment
when stopped by police.”53 Moving to civil cases, the Commentary
advised, “a judge must not use the judge’s judicial position to gain
advantage in a civil suit involving a member of the judge’s family.” 54 The
widespread use of court stationery to lend the prestige of office to a
judge’s non-judicial endeavors55 explains the Code’s warning, “judicial
49. In re Klein, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct July 6, 1981).
50. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B (Am. Bar Ass’n1990).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2C cmt. (Am. Bar Ass’n 1990).
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., In re Peeples, 374 S.E.2d 674, 677 (S.C. 1988) (finding that a judge misused judicial
prestige by sending a letter on judicial stationery demanding that the recipient make $300 monthly
payments to the judge’s friend); In re Tyler, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct May 1,
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letterhead must not be used for conducting a judge’s personal business.”56
D. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct (2007)
Canon 2B of the 1990 Code provided that “[a] judge shall not allow
family, social, political or other relationships to influence the judge’s
judicial conduct or judgment.”57 Rule 2.4 of the 2007 ABA Model Code
of Judicial Conduct (2007 Code) adopts this provision and adds
“financial” to the list of affiliations that judges must not let influence
adjudicatory or administrative decisions.58 The Rule also broadens the old
prohibition to include family, social, political, financial, or other interests
or relationships.59
Rule 1.3 of the 2007 Code addresses the misuse of judicial prestige by
providing that “[a] judge shall not abuse the prestige of judicial office to
advance the personal or economic interests of the judge or others, or allow
others to do so.”60 Rule 1.3 reflects several changes from similar
provisions in Canon 2B of the 1972 and 1990 Codes. First, the 2007 Code
substitutes the word “personal” for the word “private” in describing the
interests covered by the rule.”61 The substitution was made for purely
“stylistic” reasons with no change in meaning intended.62 Second, the
current Code prohibits not only the use of prestige to advance “personal”
interests but also prohibits the use of prestige to advance “economic”
interests.63 While it is commonly understood that both “personal
interests” and “private interests” encompass economic interests, the
drafters of the 2007 Code wanted to make it clear that Rule 1.3 prohibits
the use of judicial prestige to promote or augment financial, investment,
and business endeavors.64 Neither substituting “personal” for “private”
1989) (disciplining a judge in part for using court stationery to complain about work performed on her
father’s apartment building and using court envelopes for letters advising her father’s tenants that the
building’s water supply was contaminated); In re Muszynski, 471 So. 2d 1284, 1284 (Fla. 1985)
(disciplining a judge for sending a letter on judicial stationery directing that a police officer attend court
to explain his contemptuous conduct in failing to lower the volume of his police radio while the judge was
eating lunch); see also N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 88-02 (1988) (advising a judge not
to use her official letterhead to assist a son or daughter applying for a scholarship).
56. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2C cmt. (1990).
57. Id. Canon 2B.
58. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.4 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2007). Financial relationships
were included in the 1990 Code’s catch-all prohibition against allowing “other interests” to influence
judicial acts. See CHARLES GEYH & W. WILLIAM HODES, REPORTERS’ NOTES TO THE MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT 31 (2009).
59. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.4 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2007).
60. Id. R. 1.3.
61. Id.
62. GEYH & HODES, supra note 58, at 23.
63. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCt R. 1.3 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2007).
64. See GEYH & HODES, supra note 58, at 23.
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interests or specifically mentioning “economic” interests in Rule 1.3
changes the meaning or application of Canon 2B of the 1972 or Canon
2B of the 1990 Code.65
Third, the 2007 Code slightly modifies the provision in Canon 2B of
the prior two ABA Model Codes directing that a judge shall not “convey
or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special
position to influence the judge” and moved it to Rule 2.4(C).66 No change
in meaning was intended.
Fourth, Rule 1.3 advises judges that they cannot “allow others” to
abuse the judge’s prestige.67 The Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct was concerned that, without such an
admonishment, judges might “look the other way” if a friend or family
member invoked the judge’s name when, for example, seeking to avoid a
traffic ticket or when applying for a bank loan.68 Rule 1.3 does not explain
how a judge is to prevent a third person from attempting to exploit the
judge’s status. Properly understood, the Rule requires a judge to (1) advise
an offending third party of the judge’s duty under Rule 1.3 not to allow
others to invoke the judge’s prestige and (2) ask the person to stop using
the judge’s name.69
The fifth change to Rule 1.3 has the most potential to affect the
application of the long-standing prohibition against the misuse of judicial
prestige. The 1972 and 1990 Codes both stated that a judge must not
“lend” the prestige of office to further private interests. 70 The 2007 Code
substitutes the word “abuse” for the word” lend” creating the rule that “[a]
judge shall not abuse the prestige of judicial office.”71 The Reporters’
Notes to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct explains that the change was
made because of the confusion created by the term “lend.”72 The
Reporters relate that several judges had declined to write recommendation
letters for their law clerks because, under the previous ABA Model Codes,
to do so would “lend” the prestige of their judicial offices to the clerk’s
65. See id.
66. Compare MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.4(C) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2007) (“A judge
shall not convey or permit others to convey the impression that any person or organization is in a position
to influence the judge”), with MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B (Am. Bar Ass’n 1990)
(“[N]or shall a judge convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position
to influence the judge.”).
67. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.3 (Am. Bar. Ass’n 2007).
68. See GEYH & HODES, supra note 58, at 23.
69. Cf. id. at 98 (suggesting that when a family member of a judge is running for public office, the
judge must take reasonable steps to prevent family members from indicating that the judge endorses the
family member’s candidacy).
70. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B (Am. Bar Ass’n 1972); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT CANON 2B (Am. Bar Ass’n 1990).
71. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.3 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2007).
72. GEYH & HODES, supra note 58, at 22.
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job search.73 The judges’ concern is surprising since the Commentary to
the 1990 Model Code specifically provided that a judge may write a letter
of recommendation or serve as a reference as long as the recommendation
or reference was based on the judge’s personal knowledge.74 In fact, the
1990 Code added this commentary specifically to address the situation
where a judge receives a request to write a reference for a clerk or other
court employee.75
As a second illustration of the confusion purportedly created by the
word “lend,” the Reporters explain that by disclosing their judicial status
on book jackets, judges might “lend” the prestige of judicial office to the
sale of books that they author.76 Again, this illustration is surprising
because no ethics committee interpreting the 1972 or 1990 Code had
found an impropriety in identifying a judge as the author of a book.
Indeed, judicial ethics advisory committees concluded just the opposite—
mentioning an author’s judicial status on a book cover or book jacket did
not lend the prestige of office to advance private interests.77
The drafters of Rule 1.3 assumed that changing the standard from
lending prestige to abusing prestige would cabin the rule to serious
offenses and exclude innocent or inconsequential uses of judicial prestige
in the everyday affairs of judges.78 Several states considered the change
significant, as well as unwise, and refused to adopt the ABA’s suggestion
to replace “lend” with “abuse.”79 But as used in judicial codes, the terms
lend and abuse are, for all practical purposes, interchangeable. Lend, as
used in Rule 1.3 means, “to allow the temporary use of (something).”80

73. Id.
74. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B cmt. (Am. Bar Ass’n 1990).
75. LISA L. MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 14 (1992).
76. See GEYH & HODES, supra note 58, at 23.
77. See, e.g., Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 82-05 (1985) (advising that the title page
of a book may describe the author’s judicial position and experience); Ark. Judicial Ethics Advisory
Comm. Op. 2005-06 (2005) (permitting a judge’s robed photograph to appear on a book jacket). Judges
routinely identify their judicial office on the cover or jacket of books that they author. See, e.g., SANDRA
DAY O’CONNOR, CHICO (2005) (describing the author as the “first woman Supreme Court Justice” on the
book’s front cover); RUTH BADER GINSBURG, MY OWN WORDS (2016) (exhibiting a photograph of
Justice Ginsburg in her robe in a courtroom on the front cover and including a biographical sketch of
Justice Ginsburg in the “About the Authors” section of the book); RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF
LEGAL THEORY (2001) (identifying Richard A. Posner as “Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit,” on the book jacket).
78. Cf. OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2017), Comparison to Ohio Code of Judicial
Conduct (2009) (indicating that the “abuse” standard may be less restrictive than the “lend” standard).
79. See, e.g., KAN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2009); GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
R. 1.3 (2016).
80. Ohio Board of Comm’rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 2011-3 (2011) (quoting BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 985 (9th ed. 2009)). Rule 1.3 of the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct is identical to Rule
1.3 of the 2007 ABA Model Code. See Ohio Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, Op.
2011-3 (2011).
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Abuse means, “to use ‘improperly’ or misuse.”81 Thus, a judge violated
the “lend” standard of the 1972 and 1990 Model Codes whenever he or
she temporarily used judicial prestige to advance private interests. That
temporary usurpation of prestige to further a private interest constituted
an “improper” use of judicial prestige under Canon 2B of both the 1972
and 1990 Codes. Indeed, the Commentary to Canon 2B of the 1990 Code
indicated that the Canon prohibited the “improper use of the prestige of
office” and cautioned against the “possible abuse of the prestige of
office.”82 Under the “abuse” standard of the 2007 Code, a judge violates
Rule 1.3 by improperly using judicial prestige to advance private or
personal interests. Applying either the term lend or the term abuse, the
result is the same. Simply put, both terms prohibit the “improper use” or
“misuse” of judicial prestige. Two Ohio judicial ethics advisory opinions
illustrate the interchangeability of the terms “lend” and “abuse” in the
context of judicial code provisions governing judicial prestige.
In Opinion 91-29, the Ohio Board of Commissioners on Grievances
and Discipline considered whether a judge may publicly endorse a lawyer
running for an elective office in a bar association.83 In 1991, when the
opinion was issued, Canon 2B of the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct
provided that a judge shall not lend the prestige of office to advance
private interests.84 In Opinion 91-29, the Ohio Board of Commissioners
determined that publicly supporting a bar candidate improperly lends the
prestige of judicial office to the lawyer’s candidacy and therefore violated
Ohio Canon 2B.85 Twenty years later, the Ohio Board of Commissioners
reexamined the question in light of the amendment to the state’s judicial
code replacing the prohibition against “lending” judicial prestige with the
prohibition against “abusing” judicial prestige.86 The Board of
Commissioners reaffirmed its earlier opinion reasoning that because
endorsing a bar candidate was an improper use of judicial prestige, an
endorsement violated both the “lend” and “abuse” standards.87 As
demonstrated by the two Ohio ethics opinions, the change in terminology
from lend to abuse will have negligible impact because both terms mean
no more or no less than improper use of judicial power or prestige.
Comment 1 to Rule 1.3 of the 2007 Code repeats the example
appearing in the Commentary to Canon 2B of the 1990 Code stating that
81. Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 2011-3 (2011) (quoting BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 10 (9th ed. 2009) and the OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/822 (online version Sept. 2011)).
82. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B cmt. (Am. Bar Ass’n 1990).
83. Ohio Bd of Comm’rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 91-29 (1991).
84. OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B (1991) (emphasis added).
85. Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances and Disciple, Op. 91-29 (1991).
86. Ohio Bd of Comm’rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 11- 3 (2011).
87. Id.
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it is improper for a judge to allude to his or her judicial position to gain
favorable treatment during a traffic stop.88 For some unexplained reason,
the Comments to Rule 1.3 delete the admonishment found in the
Commentary to old Canon 2B that a judge should refrain from interfering
on behalf of family members in civil lawsuits. Whatever persuaded the
Joint Commission to omit that part of the 1990 Commentary, it certainly
was not that judges had ceased misusing judicial prestige to influence
private civil matters.89 Comment 1 to Rule 1.3 also refines the prohibition
against using court stationery “for conducting a judge’s personal
business” found in the 1990 Code.90 The drafters of the 2007 Code
believed that the 1990 Code provision was too broad and that a judge
could send a letter to a former college roommate, for example, discussing
the good old days without misusing official prestige.91 Thus, Comment 1
to Rule 1.3 only bars the use of “judicial letterhead to gain an advantage”
in conducting the judge’s personal business.92
E. Bestowing Judicial Favors in Investigatory and Adjudicative
Matters Destroys Public Confidence in the Judiciary
Why have the authors of judicial codes made such a concerted effort
to prevent judges from using their official positions to influence the
outcomes of even inconsequential matters like parking tickets? Why, in
light of the never-ending litany of serious legal, moral, and ethical
misdeeds of judges,93 has the California Commission on Judicial
Performance labeled “ticket-fixing” as “the quintessential bad act of a
judge”?94
The public grants the judiciary enormous power and prestige 95 in
return for the promise that judges will impartially employ that power and
88. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2007).
89. See, e.g., In re Stevens, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Dec. 23, 1998)
(disciplining a judge for using “the prestige of his office to advance his son's interest in a private dispute”);
Private Admonishment of a Justice of the Peace (Tex. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct June 8, 2005)
(finding that a judge misused official prestige in a private lawsuit when he used his title in a pre-suit
demand letter and in pleadings) http://www.scjc.texas.gov/disciplinary-actions/private-sanctions/fy2005/priv-adm-of-jp-060805.
90. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B cmt. (Am. Bar Ass’n 1990).
91. GEYH & HODES, supra note 58, at 23.
92. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2007).
93. See Geoffrey Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEX. L. REV. 431, 432-55 (2004) (providing hundreds of
examples of judicial misconduct).
94. In re Stanford, Order of Removal, (Cal. Comm’n on Judicial Performance Jan. 11, 2012).
95. “Empirical studies have verified the relatively high level of prestige accorded to judges in our
society, a status that has remained quite stable over the last seventy-five years.” Linz Audain, The
Economics of Law-Related Labor V: Judicial Careers, Judicial Selection, and an Agency Cost Model of
the Judicial Function, 42 AM. U. L REV. 115, 120 (1992).
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prestige to advance the legitimate interests of judicial branch of
government.96 Judges covenant to not use their public offices to advance
private interests or to benefit favored individuals. 97 Thus, the personal
integrity of the judiciary is diminished whenever a judge abuses the
public’s trust to obtain an advantage in his or her private life. For example,
a judge who uses judicial letterhead to resolve a dispute with a telephone
company98 or to seek a waiver of late fees from an insurance agency, 99
causes the public to question the judge’s character and integrity. 100 That
is bad enough. However, even more detrimental to the judicial system is
a judge who dispenses or seeks a favor for himself or another in an
investigatory or adjudicatory proceeding. A judge who sends a letter on
judicial stationery to an automobile dealer to complain about perceived
defects in his automobile demonstrates a lack of character and integrity.101
A judge who adjusts the disposition of a traffic ticket for a “special”
litigant demonstrates not only a lack of character and integrity, but also
corrupts the judicial system.
Fixing cases creates a “two-track system of justice;”102 one for average,
unconnected citizens and another for connected, influential people.103 The
litigants entitled to special treatment include judges; judges’ families,
friends, and acquaintances; court employees; politicians; and anyone else
who a judge anoints as above the law.104 The unequal and discriminatory
application of the law allows select individuals to evade the rule of law.
Additionally, granting special treatment to certain individuals is directly
contrary to the judicial oath that requires judges to “administer justice
without respect to persons.”105 When personal relationships trump the
law, those held subject to the law become inferior, second-class citizens,

96. See Raymond J. McKoski, Charitable Fund-Raising by Judges: The Give and Take of the 2007
ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 769, 779-80.
97. See id. at 780 (“The misuse [of office] violates the covenant between the judge and the people
that the power and prestige bestowed upon the judicial office may be invoked by the temporary holder of
that office only to advance the legitimate interests of the judicial branch of government.”).
98. In re Horowitz, Determination, (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct July 16, 2007).
99. In re Gallagher, 951 P.2d 705, 710-712 (Ore. 1998).
100. See STEVEN LUBET, BEYOND REPROACH; ETHICAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
ACTIVITIES OF STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES 7 (Am Judicature Soc’y 1984).
101. See Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 81-08 (1981).
102. In re Stanford, supra, note 94.
103. N.Y. STATE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT, TICKET-FIXING: THE ASSERTION OF
INFLUENCE IN TRAFFIC CASES, INTERIM REPORT 16-17 (1977).
104. See infra notes 109-142 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 453 (1990); In re Justin, 809 N.W.2d 126, 137 (Mich. 2012)
(“Respondent's intentional abuses of judicial power to benefit himself, his spouse, and his staff are
inconsistent with his oath of office and deleterious to the integrity and honor of the judiciary.”).
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“in other words chumps.”106 A two-tiered justice system breeds disrespect
for the courts even among those who receive favors.107 Hostility arises
when a litigant accustomed to receiving special treatment faces a judge
who faithfully follows the law. As described by a chief judge testifying in
a disciplinary proceeding against a judge supervised by the chief judge:
These people (who had received preferential treatment from the
offending judge) were indignant with us when we imposed a
sentence, because [the offending judge] didn't do this. Why are you
doing this to me? Why are you sentencing me? Because [the
offending judge] didn't do this. It was a different kind of justice in
that courtroom than the justice that was received by or administrated
by the other three judges. And, yes, there were repercussions; there
were people that were extremely angry, people who questioned our
authority for doing what we were doing.108
With good reason, the authors of judicial conduct codes unmistakably
and emphatically prohibit the use of judicial power and prestige to
advance private interests. Nevertheless, too many judges ignore the
prohibition and routinely exploit their official position to benefit
themselves and others. Part III demonstrates the pervasiveness of the
problem.
III. THE PERVASIVE MISUSE OF JUDICIAL POWER AND PRESTIGE
Judges misuse their official power and prestige to benefit individuals
with varying degrees of relationship to the judge. Of course, top on the
list of beneficiaries are the judges themselves,109 followed closely by
family members including spouses,110 sons,111 daughters,112 brothers,113

106. December Green, Corruption in Brazil, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE: SOURCES, STATUS AND PROSPECTS 50 (Charles Funderbuck ed., 2012).
107. TICKET-FIXING, supra note 103, at 17.
108. Justin, 809 N.W.2d at 138 n.48.
109. See, e.g., Spruance v. Comm’n on Judicial Qualifications, 532 P.2d 1209, 1220 (Cal. 1975).
110. See, e.g., In re Pomrenke, Opinion (Judicial Inquiry and Review Comm’n of Va. Nov. 27,
2017) (removing a judge for attempting to influence witnesses in his wife’s corruption trial); In re Magill,
Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Oct. 6, 2004); Justin, 809 N.W.2d at 136.
111. See, e.g., In re Sullivan, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct July 14, 2015); In
re Ramirez, 135 P.3d 230, 233 (N.M. 2006); In re Nesbitt, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial
Conduct June 21, 2002); Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Brown, 761 So. 2d 182, 183 (Miss. 2000);
In re Edwards, 492 N.E.2d 124, 124 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1986).
112. See, e.g., In re Harned, 357 N.W.2d 300, 300 (Iowa 1984); In re Pastrick, Determination (N.Y.
Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Aug. 17, 2005).
113. See, e.g., In re Snow’s Case, 674 A.2d 573, 574 (N.H. 1996).
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brothers-in-law,114 sisters,115 nephews,116 nieces,117 grandsons,118 stepgrandsons,119 granddaughters,120 and spouses’ first cousins.121 Significant
others, such as girlfriends,122 and godfathers123 also receive assistance.
Judges help co-workers such as assistant public defenders,124 other
judges,125 interns,126 and court staff;127 former clients;128 patrons of the
judge’s side business; 129 state and county officials;130 pastors;131
politicians;132 golfing-buddies;133 athletes;134 and political supporters.135

114. See, e.g., In re Kadur, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct May 28, 2003).
115. See, e.g., Public Reprimand of Smith (N.C. Judicial Standards Comm’n Apr. 1, 2009).
116. See, e.g., id; In re Hawthorne, Public Reprimand (Tex. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Nov. 9,
2017) (reprimanding Judge Hawthorne for requesting another judge to withdraw an arrest warrant issued
for Judge Hawthorne’s nephew); In re Marcuzzo, 770 N.W.2d 591, 594 (Neb. 2009).
117. See, e.g., In re Burgess, 85 So. 3d 604 (La. 2012) (censuring a judge for intervening on behalf
of his niece who was seeking a protective order against her husband); In re Parro, 847 So. 2d 1178, 1181
(La. 2003).
118. See, e.g., In re Leonard, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Dec. 26, 2002).
119. See, e.g., In re LaBombard, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Dec. 12, 2007);
In re Lorona, 875 P.2d 795, 799 (Ariz. 1994).
120. See, e.g., In re Chase, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct June 10, 1997).
121. In re Wait, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Aug. 5, 1985).
122. See, e.g., In re Deming, 736 P.2d 639, 653-54 (Wash. 1987) (en banc).
123. See, e.g., In re Platt, (Cal. Comm’n on Judicial Performance Aug. 5, 2002).
124. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Oldfield, 16 N.E.3d 581, 583-84 (Ohio 2014).
125. See, e.g., In re Bartlett v. Enea, 359 N.Y.S.2d 364, 365-66 (App. Div. 1974) (removing a judge
in part for intervening in a case on behalf of a magistrate’s friend at the request of the magistrate).
126. See, e.g., In re Simpson, 902 N.W.2d 383, 398, 405-06 (Mich. 2017) (suspending a judge for
interfering with the investigation and prosecution of the judge’s intern).
127. See, e.g., In re Justin, 809 N.W.2d 126, 136 (Mich. 2012) (removing a judge for dismissing
traffic citations issued to the judge, his wife, and his staff).
128. See, e.g., In re Santini, 597 A.2d 1388, 1391-92 (N.J.1991) (disciplining a judge for contacting
a zoning officer, court clerk, and judge on behalf of a former client).
129. See, e.g., In re Freeman, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Nov. 8, 1991)
(describing a judge’s effort to assist a customer of the judge’s sporting goods store).
130. See, e.g., In re Fuselier, 837 So. 2d 1257, 1268-1271 (La. 2003) (intervening in traffic matters
at the request of the mayor, state representative, and police chief); In re Howard, Determination (N.Y.
Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Dec. 22, 1999) (admonishing a judge for contacting another judge on behalf
of the son of a town employee).
131. See, e.g., In re Stanford, Order of Removal (Cal. Comm’n on Judicial Performance Jan. 11,
2012).
132. See, e.g., Fuselier, 837 So. 2d at 1268-1271.
133. See Kelly St. John, San Jose: Ticket-Fixing Judge Sentenced—Community Service, House
Arrest, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (July 27, 2004) http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/SAN-JOSETicket-fixing-judge-sentenced-2704974.php.
134. See id.
135. See, e.g., Fuselier, 837 So. 2d at 1269.
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While judges misuse prestige to benefit friends136 and acquaintances,137
there is no prerequisite that a judge actually know the person receiving
favorable treatment. Accordingly, judges have put their careers on the line
for the son of a family friend,138 a friend of the judge’s friend’s son,139 a
family member of an acquaintance,140 a friend of a friend,141 and a
defendant whose mother knew the judge’s brother-in-law’s sister.142
Some judges have claimed that they play no favorites and accept requests
for favors from everyone and treat all requests “equally.” 143
Similarly, the types of adjudicatory and investigatory matters that
judges seek to influence have no limits. Judges use their official power
and prestige to personally, or through third parties, dismiss criminal and
traffic charges;144 reduce charges;145 continue court proceedings;146 obtain
the release of persons in custody;147 reduce fine and restitution
amounts;148 withdraw arrest warrants;149 release defendants on bond;150
prevent arrests;151 reinstate licenses;152 convince tenants to vacate their
homes;153 collect debts;154 forestall the execution of search warrants;155
enter a park without paying the required fee;156 bypass security
136. See, e.g., In re Parker, Letter of Removal from Office (Ark. Judicial Discipline and Disability
Comm’n Dec. 31, 2016) (finding that a judge “improperly performed judicial acts to the benefit of many
defendants who were either friends or former clients . . . .”).
137. See, e.g., In re Skinner, 690 N.E.2d 484 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1997) (dismissing charges against a
“social acquaintance” in an ex parte proceeding).
138. See, e.g., In re Kiley, 546 N.E.2d 916, 917 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1989).
139. See, e.g., id.
140. See, e.g., In re Platt, (Cal. Comm’n on Judicial Performance Aug. 5, 2002).
141. See, e.g., In re Kolbert, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Dec 26, 2002).
142. See, e.g., In re Smith, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct June 19, 2013).
143. See TICKET-FIXING, supra note 103, at 13.
144. Id. at 2; see also In re McGowan, Stipulation (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct July 15,
2008).
145. TICKET-FIXING, supra note 103, at 2; see also In re Schurr, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on
Judicial Conduct Mar. 23, 2009).
146. See, e.g., In re Kutribis, 99 CC 3, Order (Ill. Cts. Comm’n Aug. 29, 2002).
147. See, e.g., In re Petrucell (Cal. Comm’n on Judicial Performance Aug. 27, 2015); In re Cowart,
71 So. 3d 590, 598 (Miss. 2011),
148. TICKET-FIXING, supra note 103, at 2; see also In re Keefe, Complaint (N.Y. Comm’n on
Judicial Conduct Aug. 15, 2016).
149. See, e.g., In re VanBuskirk, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct May 23, 1989).
150. See, e.g., In re Labombard, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Dec. 12, 2007).
151. See, e.g., In re Kolbert, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Dec. 26, 2002).
152. See, e.g., In re Thompson, 169 So. 3d 857, 863 (Miss. 2015) (removing judge in part for
attempting to convince the sheriff to lift the suspension on a bail bondsman’s license).
153. See, e.g., In re Merrill, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct May 14, 2007).
154. See, e.g., In re Josey, 292 S.E.2d 59, 60 (Ga. 1982) (suspending a judge for using the prestige
of judicial office to collect a debt).
155. See, e.g., In re Hensley, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct June 22, 2012); In
re Leonard, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Dec. 26, 2002).
156. See, e.g., In re Pennington, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Nov. 3, 2003).
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procedures;157 influence school officials,158 insurance companies,159
medical doctors,160 travel agents,161 banks,162 and telephone companies;163
influence judges handling family law matters164 and dog at large cases;165
secure withdrawal of an order of protection;166 and obtain charitable167
and political168 contributions.
In most areas of judicial conduct, judges learn from their colleagues’
mistakes and tailor their behavior to comport with ethical rules and the
pronouncements of judicial disciplinary commissions. But a segment of
the judiciary appears unable or unwilling to abide by the unequivocal rule
uniformly enforced by disciplinary commissions, that the abuse of the
judicial office constitutes a serious ethical offense. The history of the
misuse of judicial power and prestige by New York judges in adjudicative
and investigatory matters illustrates the point.
A. The Misuse of Judicial Power and Prestige: A Case Study
In 1977, the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct issued
a report, “Ticket-Fixing: The Assertion of Influence in Traffic Cases,
detailing judicial ticket-fixing practices in the state.169 The New York
Commission’s investigation disclosed a systemic and widespread misuse
of judicial power and prestige in traffic matters. More than 250 judges in
thirty-eight of New York’s sixty-two counties dispensed favors, requested
favors from other judges, or both.170 These were not isolated incidents.

157. See, e.g., In re Moskos, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Oct. 3, 2016).
158. See, e.g., In re Mosley, 102 P.3d 555, 559 (Nev. 2004) (disciplining a judge for sending a letter
on court stationery to a school principal requesting that the mother of the judge's son be barred from
visiting the son at school).
159. See, e.g., In re Gallagher, 951 P.2d 705, 710-12 (Ore. 1998) (disciplining a judge for using
judicial stationery to negotiate favorable terms in dealing with service providers and vendors).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., In re Coates, Public Admonishment (Cal. Comm'n on Judicial Performance April 12,
2000) (admonishing a judge for using judicial stationery to request that a line of credit be converted from
“unsecured” to “secured” in connection with refinancing the judge's home).
163. See, e.g., In re Horowitz, Stipulation (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct June 21, 2007).
164. See, e.g., In re Young, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Dec. 29, 2000).
165. See, e.g., In re Van Woeart, Determination (N.Y. Comm. on Judicial Conduct Aug. 20, 2012).
166. See, e.g., In re Williams, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct May 17, 2002).
167. See, e.g., In re Brown, 662 N.W.2d 733 (Mich. 2003) (disciplining a judge in part for
“sponsoring” a charitable golf-outing); In re Quall, Public Admonishment (Cal. Comm'n on Judicial
Performance June 2, 2008) (disciplining a judge in part for soliciting items for a charity auction).
168. See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1659, 1673 (2015) (upholding the
discipline of a judge for personally soliciting campaign contributions).
169. TICKET-FIXING, supra note 103.
170. Id. at 1.
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One judge admitted granting special treatment in 500 cases. 171 The
Commission acknowledged that no investigations were conducted in
twenty-four of New York’s counties and that only a small fraction of the
corrupt practice had been uncovered.172 In the “overwhelming majority”
of fixed cases, no money or other benefit inured to the judge.173 Thus, the
majority of illegal dispositions including charge reductions, dismissal of
charges, reduced or no fines, and sham bail forfeitures, simply reflected
personal favors for special litigants.174
After discussing the detrimental effects of ticket-fixing on the state’s
justice system, the New York Commission emphasized that its purpose in
publishing the report was “to alert the public, the courts, district attorneys,
police officials, and any town and village justices and other judges who
are engaging in these practices, to the seriousness of this misconduct.”175
The Commission further promised that it would continue investigating
ticket-fixing allegations and take appropriate disciplinary steps against
offenders.176 True to its word, the Commission publicly disciplined more
than 140 judges involved in the scandal detailed in the 1977 report.177
According to one Commissioner, the Report together with the resulting
disciplinary proceedings “placed every judge in the State on notice that
ticket-fixing would not be tolerated.”178
Because the “abhorrent” practices disclosed by the Commission’s
investigation made the front page of the New York Times,179 and resulted
in the discipline of more than 140 judges180 over a period of five years,181
it is unlikely that any state judge failed to “receive the memo” that ticketfixing violated the New York Code of Judicial Conduct. Nevertheless,
ticket-fixing continued.

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 2.
TICKET-FIXING, supra note 103, at 5-11.
Id. at 20.
Id.
N.Y. COMM’N ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT, REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON
JUDICIAL CONDUCT REGARDING LICENSE PLATES THAT IDENTIFY A PRIVATELY-OWNED AUTOMOBILE
AS REGISTERED TO A JUDGE 26 (2013) (“After the Commission uncovered a widespread pattern of ticket
fixing throughout the state in the late 1970's, more than 140 judges were disciplined for engaging in this
misconduct.”).
178. In re Cook, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Aug. 31, 2005) (Mr. Emery,
dissenting).
179. Tom Goldstein, Judicial Study Finds 250 Judges Involved in Fixing of Tickets, N.Y. TIMES,
June 20, 1977, at 1.
180. See N.Y. COMM’N ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra, note 177.
181. See, e.g., In re Zygmont, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Dec. 2, 1980); In
re Wright, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Feb 11, 1981).; In re Prichard
Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct June 10, 1982).
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In April 1979, while the New York Commission on Judicial Conduct
was still processing disciplinary proceedings against the judges identified
in its 1970’s ticket-fixing investigation, Judge Deluca convinced Judge
D'Amaro to meet him for a private conversation.182 In that conversation,
Judge Deluca sought leniency for a defendant appearing before Judge
D’Amaro because the defendant was from a good family and had a wife
dying from cancer.183 Rejecting Judge Deluca’s assertion that any
wrongdoing was committed, the Commission reiterated the overarching
principle enunciated in its 1977 report: “[r]equests by one judge to another
for special consideration for any person are ‘wrong and always have been
wrong.’”184
In May 1980, while the Commission continued the process of
disciplining judges whose abuse of office was disclosed by the 1970s
investigation, Judge Robert M. Jacon presided over a case in which a
client was charged with disorderly conduct.185 Judge Jacon told the client
not to attend court on the return date. Instead, the judge spoke with the
arresting officer and secured the officer’s agreement to adjourn the case
in contemplation of dismissal.186 The judge then dismissed the case.187 In
June 1980, Judge Edwards, by telephone and by letter, sought to influence
a colleague’s handling of a traffic citation issued to another judge’s son.188
Later in 1980, Judge Albert Montaneli contacted the arresting officer,
prosecutor, and presiding judge seeking leniency for a friend charged with
serving alcohol to minors.189
In January 1981, Judge Louis Kaplan contacted another judge’s court
clerk to obtain a continuance in a friend’s case.190 In disciplining Judge
Kaplan, the New York Commission once again condemned the two-tier
justice system described in its 1977 Report:
[b]y intervening in a case in another court to obtain an adjournment
for a friend, respondent lent “the prestige of his . . . office to advance
182. In re Deluca, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct July 2, 1984).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. In re Jacon, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Nov. 28, 1983).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. In re Edwards, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Sept. 18, 1985) (removing
Judge Edwards for contacting another judge several times between 1980 and 1983 concerning cases
involving Judge Edward’s son).
189. In re Montaneli, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Sept. 10, 1982) (censuring
Judge Montanelli); see also In re Milks, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Jan. 20, 1982)
(disciplining part-time judge Ruth Milks for using her judicial title and prestige in 1980 to collect a debt
on behalf of her private employer).
190. In re Kaplan, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct May 17, 1983).
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the private interests of others . . . .” Respondent took advantage of
his position to get from a court clerk what his friend or any other
person could only have obtained from a judge for good cause shown:
an adjournment of a case scheduled for the following day. Such
interventions by a judge cloaked in the authority of his office have
in the past met with public sanction, even when done for
understandable reasons. 191
In April 1982, Judge Reedy intervened on behalf of his son and a
friend’s son, both of whom had traffic tickets pending before another
judge.192 In December 1982, Judge McGee entered the robing room of
Judge Duffy.193 Judge McGee advised Judge Duffy that McGee’s nephew
would appear before Judge Duffy that evening on a criminal charge.194
He further advised Judge Duffy that his nephew recently graduated law
school and that he hoped Judge Duffy would set a low bail amount.195 In
December 1982 and January 1983, Judge Seiffert sought special treatment
for his stepson and two acquaintances in traffic and criminal matters.196
According to the New York Commission, Judge Seiffert went “to
extraordinary lengths to pressure prosecutors to agree to charge
reductions not available to other defendants.”197 Also in January 1983,
Judge Calabretta telephoned a colleague at home and requested a
continuance in a friend’s partnership dissolution case.198 In 1983, Judge
Ronald L. Fabrizio was disciplined for seeking special treatment in traffic
matters for a family friend and the dentist of the judge’s brother.199 In
November 1983, a New York Supreme Court Judge telephoned a town
court justice at 4:00 a.m. to seek the release of friends held in police
custody.200 Most telling is the misconduct of Judge Skramko who, on June
191. Id.
192. In re Reedy, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct June 29, 1984). Judge Reedy
was previously disciplined for “failure to supervise the preparation and handling of court accounts, reports
and records.” In re Reedy, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct December 28, 1981).
193. In re McGee, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Apr. 12, 1984).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. In re Seiffert, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Oct. 26, 1984).
197. Id.
198. In re Calabretta, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Apr. 11, 1984)
(admonishing Judge Calabretta for abusing judicial prestige); see also In re Mayville, Determination
(N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Mar. 15, 1984) (removing a judge for, among other things, misusing
judicial prestige to collect debts for relatives, a co-judge, and the town clerk).
199. In re Fabrizio, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Dec. 26, 1984) see also In
re Wait, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Aug. 5, 1985) (removing a judge for granting
relatives favorable case dispositions in 1981, 1982, and 1983).
200. In re Gassman, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Mar. 26, 1986) (imposing
an admonishment); see also In re Lombardi, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Jan. 2,
1986) (censuring a judge for ordering the release of a prisoner at the request of a friend).
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8, 1983, advised Judge Davis that a friend had received a traffic
citation.201 Judge Skramko suggested that the matter could be settled by
reducing the charge and imposing a fifty-dollar fine.202 When Judge Davis
balked at the suggestion, stating that he did not “do business that way,”
Judge Skramko responded, “[u]s judges do that all the while.”203 It is
difficult to argue with Judge Skramko’s expertise in the misuse of judicial
prestige since he had been previously disciplined for ticket-fixing as part
of the 1970s investigation.204
When stopped in April 1984 for driving under the influence, Judge
Kremenick told the officer, “I’m the judge. You can’t do this to me. I’ll
have your job.”205 At his first court appearance, Judge Kremenick
repeatedly advised the arraignment judge, “I’m the judge, and you can’t
do this.”206 Later that same year, at the request of a friend, Judge Manning
contacted a prosecutor and arranged for the adjournment of a case in
contemplation of dismissal, which was an unusual disposition for a
larceny case in the judge’s court.207 The New York Commission removed
Judge Conti from office for conduct occurring in 1984 that included
reassigning a case to his court, altering court documents to reflect a lesser
charge, and dismissing a case involving the son of another judge. 208
In 1985, Judge Little was asked by a bank vice-president to reduce a
traffic charge for the vice president’s daughter to ensure that insurance
premiums would not increase.209 Judge Little reduced the ticket to a
parking violation.210 The judge testified at the disciplinary hearing “that
it is his practice to grant such requests when made by a person of
integrity.”211 Exhibiting the same approach to two-tiered justice, Judge
LoRusso felt entitled to contact the police and demand (1) that his friend’s
son be released from custody, and (2) that he be addressed during the
conversation as Judge LoRusso rather that Mr. LoRusso. 212 At his
disciplinary hearing, Judge LoRusso admitted that he should not have
201. In re Skramko, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Aug. 23, 1984).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. In re Skramko, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct May 20, 1980) (censuring
Judge Skramko for misusing his judicial office to influence the outcome of cases).
205. In re Kremenick, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct June 28, 1985).
206. Id.
207. In re Manning, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Aug. 15, 1986).
208. In re Conti, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct March 27, 1987). The
Commission also found that Judge Conti had improperly dismissed a charge filed against his long-time
friend and personal attorney).
209. In re Little, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Nov. 19, 1987).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. In re LoRusso, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct June 29, 1987) (imposing
a censure).
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asked for the prisoner’s release but added that in a similar future situation
he would call the police, vouch for the credibility of the prisoner’s
parents, and request that the police “allay the parent’s anxiety.” 213 Also in
1985, the New York Commission disciplined other judges for abusing the
power and prestige of office, including a judge who conducted a friend’s
bail hearing at the judge’s home in a case over which the judge lacked
jurisdiction;214 a judge who “fixed” a case for his wife’s employer;215 and
a judge who continued a case at a political leader’s ex parte request.216
The remainder of the decade showed no improvement in the misuse of
the judicial office by New York judges. 217 Nor did confining the use of
judicial power and prestige to official purposes fare any better in New
York State in the 1990s.218
213. Id.
214. In re Winick, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Jan. 29, 1987).
215. In re Robertiello, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Feb. 23, 1988).
216. In re Levine, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Jan. 23, 1989).
217. For examples of judges disciplined for conduct involving the misuse of judicial prestige that
occurred between 1986 and 1989, see In re Reyome, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct
Dec. 24, 1987) (censuring a judge for releasing, at a friend’s request, a defendant who had been jailed by
another judge); In re Molnar, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct July 18, 1988) (removing
a judge because he told a defendant that if she agreed not to report his sexual advances he would assess a
small fine in a dog ordinance case, but if she reported his conduct her dog would be killed and her son
taken away); In re Watson, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Nov. 17, 1988) (censuring
a judge in part for ordering a police captain to release the judge’s friend because the arrest was “a lot of
crap”); In re Abbott, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Apr. 5, 1989); In re Cosby,
Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Sept. 9, 1989) (disciplining a judge for threatening
that he would stop cooperating with a police department “if they’re going to report D.W.I.s on Republican
candidates”); In re D’Amanda, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Apr. 26, 1989)
(censuring a judge for, on three occasions, attempting to avoid traffic tickets by invoking his judicial
status); In re Hanofee, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Oct. 27, 1989) (censuring a
judge for, among other things, telephoning another judge to seek favorable treatment for a lawyer and the
lawyer’s client); In re Kiley, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Apr. 3, 1989) (removing
a judge in part for contacting a prosecutor and judge to volunteer information in support of a defendant’s
release on bond); In re Tyler, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct May 1, 1989) (removing
a judge in part for contacting another judge about her husband’s litigation and using court stationery in
three personal disputes); In re VanBuskirk, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct May 23,
1989) (admonishing a judge in part for intervening on a litigant’s behalf to obtain withdrawal of an arrest
warrant); In re Kristofferson, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Oct. 25, 1990) (finding
that a judge “used the prestige of his judicial office to advance the interests of one party to a dispute”); In
re Slavin, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Feb. 28, 1990) (admonishing a judge for
misusing judicial prestige to advance private interests by intervening in a dispute involving his son, and
making threats against persons who knew that he was a judge).
218. For examples of judges disciplined for the misuse of judicial prestige for conduct occurring
between 1990 and 1999, see In re Freeman, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Nov. 8,
1991) (admonishing Judge Freeman for writing a letter on judicial stationery to another judge requesting
that the judge reinstate an individual’s gun permit); In re Winkworth, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on
Judicial Conduct Sept. 23, 1992) (admonishing a judge for using his judicial title in an attempt to avoid a
DUI arrest); In re McCormick, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct June 9, 1993)
(admonishing a judge for going to a complainant’s home and trying to convince her to drop criminal
charges); In re Henderson, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Mar. 18, 1994)
(admonishing a judge for volunteering his judicial title during a traffic stop and asking the officer, “[i]sn’t
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The new millennium brought a mix of tried-and-true and novel means
to abuse judicial prestige in the Empire State. Judges continued to assert
their judicial power during confrontations with the police by both verbally
advising the officers of their official positions and by handing officers
judicial identification cards.219 Judges also continued to intervene on
there anything we can do?”); In re Poli, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Oct. 7, 1994)
(admonishing a judge for going to the police station to arraign his son and set a recognizance bond); In re
Rones, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Sept. 30, 1994) (admonishing a judge for
stopping eight motorists during 1990, 1991, and 1992 to enforce traffic laws, usually identifying himself
as a judge and showing his judicial identification); In re Lindell-Cloud, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on
Judicial Conduct July 14, 1995) (censuring a judge for abuse of power for increasing a defendant’s fine
because the defendant had previously fired the judge from a nursing job); In re Cerbone, Determination
(N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Mar. 21, 1996) (finding that a judge abused judicial prestige by
visiting a complainant at her home and speaking favorably of the defendant whose family members were
close friends of the judge); In re D’Amico, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Mar. 21,
1996) (admonishing a judge for repeatedly invoking his judicial status during his arrest for indecent
exposure); In re Hoag, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Mar. 20, 1996) (admonishing
a judge for using judicial stationery in private disputes); In re Kaplan, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on
Judicial Conduct May 6, 1996) (admonishing a judge for improperly intervening in a child abuse
investigation on behalf of a friend); In re Chase, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct June
10, 1997) (removing a judge for intervening with another judge and the police three times on behalf of his
daughter); In re Engle, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Feb. 4, 1997) (censuring a
judge for sending a letter to another judge on judicial stationery repeatedly mentioning his judicial status
and seeking leniency for a friend charged with DUI); In re Purple, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on
Judicial Conduct Sept. 29, 1997) (finding that a judge abused his office by intervening with the sheriff on
his son’s behalf); In re Hooper, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct June 29, 1996)
(admonishing a judge for amending the charges against two defendants and accepting pleas of guilty to
the amended charges in ex parte proceedings); In re Merrill, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial
Conduct Mar. 17, 1998) (admonishing a judge for invoking his judicial position in an attempt to convince
a tenant to vacate the premises owned by the judge’s friend); In re Putnam, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n
on Judicial Conduct Feb. 6, 1998) (admonishing a judge for using the prestige of office in an attempt to
influence the outcome of a case before another judge); In re Stevens, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on
Judicial Conduct Dec. 23, 1998) (admonishing a judge for using the prestige of office to advance his son's
interests in a private dispute); In re Howard, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Dec.22,
1999) (admonishing a judge for sending a letter to a judge seeking leniency for a party); In re Knott,
Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct June 11, 1999) (censuring a judge in part for invoking
his judicial status during a traffic stop); In re Going, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n Judicial Conduct Dec.
29, 2000) (removing a judge in part for issuing an ex parte order terminating the suspension of the driver's
license of a long-time acquaintance); In re Howell, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct
Apr. 6, 2000) (admonishing a judge for misusing judicial prestige by writing to another judge to advance
a prosecutor’s position).
219. See, e.g., In re Werner, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct June 21, 2002)
(disciplining a judge for handing a law enforcement officer his judicial identification card instead of a
driver’s license); In re Landicino, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Dec. 28, 2015)
(disciplining a judge for handing an officer a driver’s license and judicial identification card and
volunteering that he was coming from a judicial conference); In re Maney, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n
on Judicial Conduct Dec. 20, 2010) (disciplining a judge for identifying himself as a family court judge
and requesting “professional courtesy” when stopped for DUI); In re Hensley, Determination (N.Y.
Comm’n on Judicial Conduct June 22, 2012) (finding that a judge made two gratuitous references to his
judicial position and presented judicial identification during the execution of a search warrant at the
judge’s fraternal club); In re Knott, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Dec. 6, 2012)
(disciplining a judge for asking a police officer “[d]o you know who I am?” when the officer served the
judge with a leaving the scene of an accident ticket); In re Leonard, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on
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behalf of friends and relatives in traffic matters, 220 family law matters,221
civil and criminal matters,222 orders of protection,223 personal disputes,224
and ordinance violations.225 There seems to have been an upswing in the
use of official court stationery to buttress a judge’s attempts to exert
influence in private matters. For example, judges employed official
stationery to seek sentencing leniency for the son of a longtime family
friend;226 to seek college readmission for a judge’s son; 227 to influence the
disposition of pending charges;228 to deter a neighborhood band from

Judicial Conduct Dec. 26, 2002) (finding that a judge improperly asserted her judicial status during a
police search at the apartment of the judge’s daughter); In re Pennington, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n
on Judicial Conduct Nov. 3, 2003) (disciplining a judge for advising a law enforcement official that he
was “the fucking judge here in this village” when confronted for entering a park without paying the entry
fee).
220. See, e.g., In re Schilling, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct May 8, 2012)
(removing a judge in part for intervening in a traffic matter involving his co-judge’s wife); In re Kennedy,
Stipulation (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Mar. 10, 2005) (stating that the judge “pressured” a state
trooper to give special treatment to a defendant who received a speeding ticket and was a business
associate of the judge’s wife’s employer); In re Taft, Stipulation (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Apr.
11, 2008) (stating that the judge dismissed his doctor’s traffic ticket after calling the doctor to obtain the
circumstances surrounding the issuance of the ticket); In re Hunt, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on
Judicial Conduct Nov. 9, 2011) (censuring a judge for contacting an officer on behalf of a friend and
advising the officer that the defendant and his family were “good people” and asking the officer to do
“whatever you can do”).
221. See, e.g., In re Young, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Dec. 29, 2000)
(censuring a judge for calling a hearing officer handling a friend’s family law case and advising the
hearing officer that his friend’s ex-husband was being a “hard ass” and refused to pay a child’s college
expenses).
222. See, e.g., In re Kolbert, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Dec. 26, 2002)
(disciplining a judge for identifying himself as a judge and requesting that a police officer not serve an
arrest warrant); In re Crandall, Stipulation (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Feb. 25, 2014) and Formal
Written Complaint (Oct. 30, 2013) (alleging that a judge intervened in a dispute between the police and
the judge’s daughter and intervened in a traffic matter on behalf of the son of a former public official).
223. See, e.g., In re Williams, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct May 17, 2002)
(censuring a judge for calling another judge on behalf of a friend and asking that an order of protection be
rescinded); In re Magill, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Oct. 6, 2004) (disciplining a
judge for delivering his daughter’s case file to the clerk of another judge and requesting that an order of
protection be entered).
224. See, e.g., In re Coleman, Stipulation (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct June 10, 2004)
(stating that the judge asserted the prestige and influence of her office during a personal dispute between
the judge and four concert attendees); In re Dumbar Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct
Apr. 18, 2004) (censuring a judge for invoking his judicial status in a dispute with a snowmobile dealer);
In re Ashbaugh, Stipulation (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Oct. 13, 2007) (stating that a judge
misused the prestige of office to advance the interests of the judge’s nephew in the nephew’s dispute with
his girlfriend).
225. See, e.g., In re Van Woeart, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Aug. 20, 2012)
(censuring a judge for contacting another judge about a dog at large case).
226. In re Martin, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct June 6, 2002).
227. In re Nesbitt, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct June 21, 2002).
228. In re Brooks, Stipulation (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Oct. 14, 2005); In re Sharlow,
Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Mar. 22, 2005).
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playing loudly;229 to dispute a telephone bill;230 to discuss church
membership fees;231 and to improperly influence a parole board.232 The
frequent use of judicial stationery for unofficial communications led the
New York Commission on Judicial Conduct to make special mention of
the problem in its 2002 and 2003 Annual Reports.233 One particular letter
on judicial letterhead and signed with the judge’s title was reproduced and
highlighted by the Commission:
I am the Judge from the Town of Chemung, Chemung County. I
would like to ask if you would consider in reviewing the attached
ticket that my relative had received while en route to his residence
from the Chemung County area.
I don’t normally request help in matters like this one, but he is a
manager with a large paper company in Rochester and he needs to
avoid any points. His company is Weyheauser Packaging.
I had called your office, but you were not available. I will have John
send in his yellow copy this week. Again, if you can help out I would
appreciate this, and if not, I will understand.234
The twenty-first century brought new technology to assist judges in
improperly asserting judicial prestige. One judge used a cell phone to
request that a police chief show leniency toward the judge’s son,235 and
another judge sent an email to a colleague “hoping” that she could be
dismissed as a defendant in several dog at large cases.236 Narrating a dash
cam video, Judge Daniels demonstrated to the clerk of the judge assigned
to the case how Judge Daniels’ employee was not responsible for the
school bus accident.237
In the new century, some judges resorted to deception in seeking
special consideration for friends. One judge wrote a letter to a neighboring

229. In re Glover, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Oct. 11, 2005).
230. In re Horowitz, Stipulation (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct June 21, 2007).
231. Id. Complaint filed March 20, 2006, attached to the Stipulation.
232. In re Smith, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct June 19, 2013).
233. N.Y. COMM’N ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT, ANNUAL REPORT 2002, at 31 (2002), available at
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Publications/AnnualReports/nyscjc.2002annualreport.pdf; N.Y. COMM’N ON
JUDICIAL
CONDUCT,
ANNUAL
REPORT
2003,
at
25
(2003),
available
at
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Publications/AnnualReports/nyscjc.2003annualreport.pdf.
234. In re Bowers, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Nov. 12, 2004).
235. In re Sullivan, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct July 14, 2015).
236. In re Van Woeart, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Aug. 20, 2012).
237. In re Daniels, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Mar. 25, 2011). (The judge
dismissed the ticket without the defendant appearing in court.).
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court seeking special consideration in a traffic case for an individual the
judge described as his relative.238 In fact, the recipient of the ticket was
not related to the judge.239 In 2013, Judge Violanti concocted an elaborate
scheme to fix a ticket.240 Apparently, to not inconvenience a friend who
received a traffic ticket, the judge asked a police officer to pretend to be
the judge’s ticketed friend, come to court, and ask that the ticket be
dismissed.241 The police officer complied and Judge Violanti dismissed
the ticket.242 In 2016, four of the eight formal disciplinary determinations
issued by the New York Commission involved the misuse of judicial
prestige.243 And in its 2018 Annual Report, the New York Commission
on Judicial Conduct once again pleads with judges to stop misusing the
prestige of office.244 Unfortunately, the unabated misuse of judicial
prestige to further private interests is not limited to the New York
judiciary.
B. The Exploitation of the Judicial Office is a National Problem
In 2015, Frank Vatterott, a former Missouri judge, claimed that ticketfixing “goes on in every city, every state. It just does.”245 And while
hopefully this is a vast overstatement, it is not difficult to demonstrate that
nationwide, judges continue to assert their judicial office for improper
purposes.
One commentator described ticket-fixing in Mississippi as a “chronic
problem.”246 That characterization appears justified by the frequency in
which the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance disciplines
238. In re Bowers, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Nov. 11, 2004).
239. Id.
240. Harold McNeil, Off Main Street/The Offbeat Side of the News, BUFFALO NEWS (N.Y.), Dec.10,
2016, available at http://buffalonews.com/2016/12/10/off-main-street-offbeat-side-news-2.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. In re Dixon, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct May 26, 2016) (censuring a
judge for misusing judicial prestige in her private lawsuit); In re Keefe, Stipulation (N.Y. Comm’n on
Judicial Conduct Aug. 5, 2016), Formal Written Complaint, Charge VIII (Nov. 13, 2014) (alleging that
the judge abused judicial prestige by contacting a victim and asking the victim to reduce her restitution
request); In re Moskos, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Oct. 3, 2016) (disciplining a
judge for using the prestige of office on three occasions to circumvent security procedures); In re
Whitmarsh, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Dec. 28, 2016) (disciplining a judge in
part for misusing the prestige of office by including her title in Facebook posts); see also In re Simon,
Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct March 29, 2016) (finding an abuse of judicial power).
244. N.Y. COMM’N ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT, ANNUAL REPORT 2018, at 19-20 (2018); see also
Richard Emery, Judges Using Their Offices to Benefit Themselves or Others: Part I, N.Y. LAW J., Oct.
24, 2017, at 3; Richard Emery, Judges Using Their Offices to Benefit Themselves or Others: Part II, N.Y.
LAW J., Oct. 27, 2017, at 3.
245. Editorial, Missouri Supreme Court Must End the Ferguson Shake-Down, ST. LOUIS DISPATCH,
Mar. 8, 2015, at A18.
246. Cynthia Gray, Ticket-Fixing, JUDICIAL CONDUCT REP., Summer 2006, at 1, 1.
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judges for fixing tickets, attempting to fix tickets, and otherwise asserting
their official position in litigation-related matters. From 1987 through
1997, ten judges were disciplined (one judge twice) for abusing their
power and prestige.247 Between 2006 and 2015, the Mississippi
Commission disciplined eleven judges for prestige-related offenses
including: (1) traditional ticket-fixing;248 (2) conduct “akin” to ticketfixing;249 (3) directing an arresting officer not to appear in court to
facilitate dismissal of a DUI ticket;250 (4) demanding that the sheriff
release a friend from custody;251 (5) attempting to prevent the arrest of the
judge’s tenant;252 (6) trying to convince the sheriff to reinstate the license
of a bail bondsman;253 and (7) requesting that a judicial colleague set a
low bond for a friend.254 The fact that the Mississippi Supreme Court took
a “firm stance on ticket-fixing” in 1993 has not dissuaded judges from the
unethical practice.255
Heading the list of Illinois judges invoking their judicial status in an
effort to avoid traffic citations is former Illinois Supreme Court Justice
James D. Heiple. On multiple occasions, Justice Heiple used his judicial
identification badge or his familiar refrain, “[d]o you know who I am,” in
dealing with law enforcement officers trying to do their job.256 Illinois
judges have also intervened in pending matters to solicit assistance for
friends, relatives, and automobile mechanics.257

247. In re Hearn, 515 So. 2d 1225 (Miss. 1987); In re Hearn, 542 So. 2d 901 (Miss. 1989); In re
Cowart, 566 So. 2d 1251 (Miss. 1990); In re Seal, 585 So. 2d 741 (Miss. 1991); In re Hopkins, 590 So.
2d 857 (Miss. 1991); In re A Justice Court Judge, 580 So. 2d 1259 (Miss. 1991); In re Chinn, 611 So. 2d
849 (Miss. 1992); In re Gunn, 614 So. 2d 387 (Miss. 1993) In re Bowen, 662 So. 2d 551 (Miss. 1995); In
re Dodds, 680 So. 2d 180 (Miss. 1996); In re Russell, 691 So. 2d 929 (Miss. 1997).
248. In re Gordon, 955 So. 2d 300 (Miss. 2007) (disciplining a judge for fixing fourteen tickets); In
re Thompson, 972 So. 2d 587 (Miss. 2008); In re Boone, 60 So. 3d 172, 179 (Miss. 2011) (disciplining a
judge for offering to “fix” a defendant’s fine in return for a sex act); In re McKenzie, 63 So. 3d 1219,
1222-23 (Miss. 2011) (disciplining a judge for fixing, or attempting to fix, nine tickets for six defendants);
In re Carver, 107 So. 3d 964, 975 (Miss. 2013).
249. In re Bradford, 18 So. 3d 251, 253 (Miss. 2009).
250. In re Sanford, 941 So. 2d 209, 218 (Miss. 2006).
251. In re Cowart, 71 So. 3d 590, 592 (Miss. 2011).
252. In re Fowles, 121 So. 3d 904, 912-13 (Miss. 2013).
253. In re Thompson, 169 So. 3d 857, 863 (Miss. 2015).
254. In re Dearman, 73 So. 3d 1140, 1141 (Miss. 2011).
255. In re Gunn, 614 So. 2d 387, 389 (Miss. 1993).
256. In re Heiple, 97 CC 1, Order (Ill. Cts. Comm’n Apr. 30, 1997). Other Illinois disciplinary
actions for similar misconduct include, In re Raccuglia, 99 CC 2, Order (Ill. Cts. Comm’n Oct. 9, 2001);
In re Travis, 02-CC 2, Order (Ill. Cts. Comm’n Feb. 28, 2003); In re Norquist, 07 CC 1, Order (Ill. Cts.
Comm’n Aug. 9, 2007).
257. See In re Simpson, 11 CC 1, Order (Ill. Cts. Comm’n Nov. 7, 2011) (censuring a judge for
putting in a good word with a second judge for his automobile mechanic and then trying to convince the
second judge not to report the matter to the state judicial disciplinary authority); In re Travis, 02 CC 2,
Order (Ill. Cts. Comm’n Feb. 28, 2003) (disciplining a judge for contacting the chief judge of another
circuit court concerning an outstanding arrest warrant for the judge’s daughter); In re Kutribis, 99 CC 3,
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In 2012, the California Commission on Judicial Performance removed
a judge for creating a “two-track” system of justice. The judge diverted to
his own courtroom traffic tickets issued to a son-in-law, friends, and a
juror, and waived or suspended all, or practically all, fines and fees in
those cases.258 In the same year, the California Commission publicly
censured a judge who requested preferential treatment for a spouse from
a subordinate traffic court commissioner.259 Since 2012, California judges
have received public or private discipline or cautionary letters for: (1)
suggesting a disposition of the judge’s son’s case to the clerk and pro tem
judge assigned to the case;260 (2) using judicial prestige and court
resources to advance the interests of a friend;261 (3) expressing irritation
to two assistant district attorneys because the judge’s letter of
recommendation for a job applicant obviously “means nothing” since the
individual was not hired by the district attorney; 262 (4) calling a county
jail and ordering the release of a member of the judge’s cigar-smoking
men’s club; 263 (5) invoking the judicial title during a traffic stop;264 (6)
selecting the judicial officer to hear the judge’s post-decree divorce
matter;265 (7) misusing official prestige in a personal legal matter;266 and
(8) lending the prestige of office to advance the personal interests of
another in a legal dispute between the judge’s friends.267
At a disciplinary hearing before the Judiciary Commission of
Louisiana, Judge Perrell Fusselier explained how his distaste for “bad
manners” prevented him from refusing ticket-fixing requests:
[t]hen the Mayor of Alexandria or Lake Charles calls and says, “By
the way, my next door neighbor or my daughter is going to school
Order (Ill. Cts. Comm’n Aug. 29, 2002) (disciplining a judge in part for contacting another judge to obtain
a continuance in a case).
258. In re Stanford, Order of Removal (Cal. Comm’n on Judicial Performance Jan. 11, 2012); see
also In re Platt (Cal. Comm’n on Judicial Performance (disciplining a judge for fixing four tickets and
contacting judges on other tickets); In re Danser, Public Censure (Cal. Comm’n on Judicial Performance
June 2, 2005) (disciplining a judge for fixing tickets in twenty-four cases); In re Wasilenko, Censure (Cal.
Comm’n on Judicial Performance Mar. 2, 2005) (disciplining a judge for diverting tickets of relatives and
friends to his courtroom and employing favored procedures and granting lenient dispositions).
259. In re Salvador Sarmiento, Public Censure (Cal. Comm’n on Judicial Performance July 5,
2012).
260. In re Mills, Public Admonishment (Cal. Comm’n on Judicial Performance July 30, 2013).
261. CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, ANNUAL REPORT 2013, at 20 (2014)
(summarizing private admonishments issued in 2013).
262. In re Steiner, Public Censure (Cal. Comm’n on Judicial Performance Sept. 2, 2014).
263. In re Petrucell, Public Censure (Cal. Comm’n on Judicial Performance Aug. 27, 2015).
264. CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, ANNUAL REPORT 2015, at 25 (2016)
(summarizing advisory letters issued in 2015).
265. In re Trice, Public Censure (Cal. Comm’n on Judicial Performance Feb. 4, 2016).
266. CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, ANNUAL REPORT 2016, at 27 (2017)
(summarizing private disciplines issued in 2016).
267. Id. at 29 (summarizing advisory letters).
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at McNeese in Lake Charles and got arrested, . . . can you help me?”
Well, it would be not only bad manners, but unrealistic to say “I’m
sorry, Mayor, I’ve known you since we were in law school together
at Tulane, but I can’t speak to you about this at all.” . . . I’m not
gonna tell him, “No, I’m not going to call.” You know, I would call
[the prosecutor] and say, “Look, the Mayor called,” or something
like that, “You have to take action. But out of courtesy, just out of
respect, he called, I’m telling you he called, would you please call
him back and y’all take care of your business.” That’s how I would
handle it. If that’s misconduct or improper ex parte communications,
. . . I think that’s the real world.268
The Texas Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly reprimanded a
judge for selecting more than 839 traffic citations for special
consideration between January 2010 and April 2011.269 In 2013, another
Texas judge received a reprimand for contacting employees of a county
juvenile detention center, a district court judge, and a county
commissioner in an effort to secure the release of a friend’s daughter from
custody.270 During those contacts, the Texas judge identified himself as a
judge, asked one official “[d]o you know who you’re talking to,” and
“[you] have picked the wrong little girl that has friends in high places to
mess with.”271 In the same year, the Texas Commission publicly
reprimanded a judge for hijacking a bond hearing from another judge so
that he could release his girlfriend from custody. 272 In 2016, at least ten
Texas judges received either public or private discipline for the misuse of
official power and prestige.273

268. In re Fuselier, 837 So. 2d 1257, 1271 (La. 2003); see also In re Alfonso, 957 So. 2d 121, 122,
124 (La. 2007) (suspending a judge for abusing judicial power and “exploit[ing] her judicial position to
satisfy personal desires” by issuing an arrest warrant without probable cause at her neighbors’ request);
In re Best, 195 So. 3d 460, 462 (La. 2016) (disciplining a judge for improperly terminating a defendant’s
probation, making ex parte inquiries regarding the defendant, and considering that the defendant and his
family attended the judge’s church).
269. In re Romo, Public Reprimand (Tex. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct July 3, 2014); see also
Dave Hendricks, The Fix: In Hidalgo Municipal Court, It's Who You Know, THE MONITOR (McAllen,
Tex.), Apr. 8, 2012, available at http://www.themonitor.com/news/local/article_b0423083-d9a4-540483a1-e771d187228c.html.
270. In re Sharp, 480 S.W.3d 829, 834 (Tex. 2013).
271. Id.
272. In re Nicholds, Public Reprimand (Tex. Comm’n on Judicial Performance Sept. 9, 2013).
Judge Nicholds had been disciplined in 2011 for attempting to use judicial prestige to assist his girlfriend’s
daughter with a pending criminal case. Id.
273. In re Scales, Public Reprimand (Tex. Comm’n on Judicial Performance July 18, 2016)
(reprimanding a judge for unilaterally amending a ticket from a speeding to a parking violation); In re
Glickler, Public Admonishment (Tex. Comm’n on Judicial Performance July 12, 2016) (disciplining a
judge in part for identifying himself as a judge during a traffic stop); In re Brady, Public Warning (Tex.
Comm’n on Judicial Performance March 3, 2016) (disciplining a judge for following a motorist for seven
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In 1957, Philadelphia opened a “no-fix” traffic court “to do away with
the time-honored custom of letting politically favored traffic violators get
away with nominal fines or no fines at all.”274 The Chief Magistrate of the
new “no-fix” court challenged “skeptics to try to fix a ticket.”275
Unfortunately, the skeptics prevailed when a massive ticket-fixing
scheme was uncovered during a federal grand jury investigation of the
Philadelphia traffic courts in 2011.276 A more recent FBI investigation
into allegations that Tennessee Judge Casey Moreland permitted personal
relations to affect judicial decisions resulted in the judge’s indictment277
and a reprimand from the state supreme court.278
As documented in Part III, it is not difficult to demonstrate the
continued and persistent exploitation of the power and prestige of judicial
office. The struggle lies in explaining why the abuse continues and in
fashioning a remedy to curtail the abuse.
miles “vehemently” signaling for her to pull over, causing the police to pull the vehicle over, threating to
throw the motorist in jail for 72 hours, and threating the motorist with contempt for disrespecting him on
the street); In re Jones, Public Warning (Tex. Comm’n on Judicial Performance Feb. 29, 2016)
(disciplining a judge for unilaterally amending speeding tickets to parking violations as a “one-time” deal
to help persons with a commercial driver’s license); In re Herrera, Public Reprimand (Tex. Comm’n on
Judicial Performance Feb. 25, 2016) (disciplining a judge for retaining his own divorce case for four
months because he was trying to save his marriage and did not want anything done on the case and wanted
to avoid court hearings). For Texas private disciplinary orders in 2016, involving the misuse of judicial
prestige, see Private Admonishment and Order of Additional Education of District Judge (3/09/16) (“[t]he
judge lent the prestige of his judicial office to advance the private interests of a defendant by permitting
court staff to send letters and other communications to another judge in a manner that was perceived by
the recipient as an improper attempt to obtain favorable or special treatment for the defendant.”); Private
Admonishment and Order of Additional Education of Justice of the Peace (9/08/16) (disciplining a judge
for misusing judicial prestige to advance her and a family member’s private interests); Private
Admonishment and Order of Additional Education of Justice of the Peace (7/28/16) (disciplining a judge
for allowing family relations to influence the judge’s official conduct in setting bond and releasing a
family member from custody).The Texas private disciplinary orders are available at Texas Commission
on Judicial Performance, Disciplinary Actions, Private Sanctions, http://scjc.state.tx.us/disciplinaryactions.aspx?t=Private+Sanctions&stype=FY+2016&ptype=1182.
274. ‘No-Fix’ Traffic Court Opens in Philadelphia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1957, at 25.
275. Id.
276. See United States v. Lowry, Nos. 13–39–02, 03, 04, 05, 2014 WL 5795575 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 6,
2014); In re Tynes, 149 A.3d 452 (Pa. Ct. of Judicial Discipline 2016); In re Sullivan, Order (Pa. Ct. of
Judicial Discipline Jan. 13, 2016); see generally John Hurdle, Philadelphia Judges Indicted in Ticket
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2013, at A20. Ticket-fixing had gone on for some time in Pennsylvania. See,
e.g., In re Kelly, 757 A.2d 456, 458 (Pa. Ct. of Judicial Discipline 2000) (disciplining a judge for asking
another judge for a “not guilty” in a friend’s traffic case).
277. See Stacey Barchenger, Feds: Moreland Tried to Pay Woman $6,100 to Recant Allegations
Against
Him,
TENNESSEAN,
Mar.
28,
2017,
10.04
a.m.
CT,
http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/crime/2017/03/28/judge-casey-moreland-charged-federalgovernment-corruption/99726856.
278. In re Moreland, Letter of Public Reprimand (Tenn. Bd. of Judicial Conduct Oct. 22, 2014),
available at http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/docs/moreland_-_public_reprimand_11-32014.pdf (disciplining Judge Moreland for convincing a court commissioner to reverse his decision and
release a defendant after Judge Moreland received a call concerning the matter from a lawyer and social
friend).
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IV. EXPLAINING THE MISUSE OF JUDICIAL POWER AND PRESTIGE
A few judges have sought to legitimize the practice of dispensing
favors on the absurd rationale that they consider all requests for special
treatment equally, but not everyone asks for a favor. 279 Most judges,
however, admit that the practice violates the law, ethics codes, and the
prime directive of judging—fair and impartial treatment for all. So why
do judges persist in the blatantly improper practice? The explanation in a
small number of cases is that the judge is corrupt and has agreed to a quid
pro quo arrangement.280 In these cases, the judge sells services to the
highest bidder. A few judges explain the actions by claiming general
ignorance of the impropriety of granting favors and specific ignorance of
ethics code provisions governing the use of judicial power and prestige.281
Sometimes the ethical shortcoming of bestowing a judicial favor to
benefit a son or daughter might be explained by the judge’s confusion
between the morality roles of judge and parent.282 And on occasion, a
judge’s improper conduct may be triggered by a diagnosable mental
disorder such as narcissism.283 But, Professor Steven Lubet offers the
most likely explanation for the practice of granting special treatment to a
select few—a misplaced sense of entitlement.284
A. Quid Pro Quo Arrangements
Some judges rent out their judicial power and prestige for a return
benefit. That benefit takes many forms including cash, 285 gifts, and
personal services. Gifts have included automobiles, health club
memberships, beds, televisions, apartments,286 cigars,287 and
contributions to political campaigns.288 Although the preferred personal
279. See TICKET-FIXING, supra note 103, at 13.
280. See infra Part IV.A.
281. See infra Part IV.B.
282. See infra Part IV.C.
283. See infra Part IV.D.
284. Steven Lubet, Stupid Judge Tricks, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1310-11 (2000); see also infra
Part IV.E.
285. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1525 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (explaining
how lawyers known as “miracle workers” could fix a traffic case for $100 to the judge and $10 to the
arresting officer); United States v. Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091, 1095, n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (reporting the
testimony of a process server that he paid a judge $100 a week to fix traffic tickets).
286. See, e.g., United States v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793, 798 (9th Cir. 1999) (describing the benefits
received by the judge and his family to include “automobiles, car repairs, money orders, an apartment,
health club memberships, and a queen-sized bed”); Vignola, 464 F. Supp. at 1095 n.8 (stating that the
judge received five color television sets).
287. Michael Brick, Former Judge Convicted of Bribery in Divorce Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19,
2007, at A22.
288. See, e.g., Martha Neil, Former Judge Pleads Guilty, Admits Taking Bribe to Cut Jury Verdict
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service sought by judges appears to be sex acts,289 other services
purchased in return for favorable case dispositions include automobile
repairs290 and political campaign support.291 Whatever form the benefit
takes, these transactions constitute the crime of bribery. 292 They are
calculated acts motivated by personal greed or a determination that the
potential benefits of the corrupt deal outweigh the potential costs. Much
more common and more difficult to explain is the misuse of judicial
prestige that either returns no direct benefit to the offending judge or
benefits the judge in an insignificant way.
B. Ignorance, Incompetence, and Stupidity
On occasion, judges explain acts of favoritism by claiming ignorance
of the rules prohibiting the use of judicial prestige and power to further
private interests. These judges lay the blame on failure to study the
applicable law, “skimming” rather than reading the law, or failing to pay
attention at judicial training sessions. 293 Usually the judges offering this
defense are non-lawyers, sometimes with no education beyond high
school.294 Obviously, disciplinary bodies refuse to accept ignorance-of-

from
$5.2M
to
$1M,
A.B.A.
J.
(Jan.
12,
2015)
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/former_judge_pleads_guilty_admits_taking_bribe_to_reduce_v
erdict_from_5.2m; see also Plea Agreement, United States v. Maggio, No. 4:15CR0000-1 BSM, (E.D.
Ark. Jan. 9, 2015) http://www.arkansasbusiness.com/public/maggio.plea.pdf.
289. See, e.g., State Bar Ass’n v. Funderburk, 284 So. 2d 564, 566-68 (La. 1973) (revoking a
judge’s law license for requiring a defendant to perform oral sex acts in order to avoid incarceration); In
re Boylan, 744 A.2d 158, 159, 162 (N.J. 2000) (disciplining a judge for soliciting sexual favors from
defendants in return for reduced fines); Miranda Materazzo, Former Justice House Pleads Guilty to
Receiving Bribe, Being Rewarded for Misconduct, WATERTOWN DAILY TIMES (NY) (Feb. 27, 2017)
(reporting a judge’s guilty plea to charges that he solicited sexual favors from a defendant in exchange for
reducing the defendant’s fine) http://www.watertowndailytimes.com/news03/former-justice-housepleads-guilty-to-receiving-bribe-being-rewarded-for-misconduct-20170227; see also Stacey Barchenger,
Records: Judge Moreland Ordered Women’s Probation, TENNESSEAN (Nashville, Tenn.) (Feb. 11, 2017)
at A4 (reporting that a woman “told at least two people she had a sexual relationship with [Judge]
Moreland, and told one friend that it was to get out of a DUI case”).
290. See, e.g., United States v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793, 798 (9th Cir. 1999).
291. See, e.g., In re Fuselier, 837 So. 2d 1257, 1268-1269 (La. 2003).
292. See 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 139 (1787) (“Bribery . . . is where a judge or other person
concerned in the administration of justice takes any undue reward to influence his behavior in office”);
18 U.S.C § 201 (defining the offense of bribery of public officials and witnesses).
293. See, e.g., In re Feinberg, 833 N.E.2d 1204, 1208 (N.Y. 2005) (rejecting a judge’s explanation
that he had only “skimmed” the provisions of the Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act); In re Britton, 936 So.
2d 898, 906 (Miss. 2006) (noting the judge’s explanation that he had not read relevant precedent and had
not read materials distributed at judicial conferences).
294. See, e.g., In re Bailey, 541 So. 2d 1036, 1039 (Miss. 1989); see also In re Sullivan, Amended
Opinion and Order 2 (Pa. Ct. of Judicial Discipline May 13, 2016) (noting that Judge Sullivan had no
formal legal training) http://www.pacourts.us/courts/court-of-judicial-discipline/court-cases/traffic-courtjudge-michael-j-sullivan-no-5-jd-14.
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the-law explanations from judges, including untrained judges.295 In
defending the requirement that public confidence in the judiciary
demands competent and impartial judges at every level, the Mississippi
Supreme Court observed:
Some say this is unrealistic, that our Justice Court Judges for the
most part have no formal training in the law. No doubt these public
servants are at a disadvantage. The people have insisted only that
each shall be a “high school graduate or have a general equivalency
diploma.” Miss. Const. Art. 6, § 171 (1890), as amended. Yet the
time is at hand when we insist that our justice court judges be
nothing less than just that-judges.
When a person assumes the office of Justice Court Judge in this
state, he or she accepts the responsibility of becoming learned in the
law. When such a person takes the oath of office, he or she yields
the prerogative of executing the responsibilities of the office on any
basis other than the fair and impartial and competent application of
the law to the facts.296
While not offered frequently as a defense, judges sometimes plead pure
“stupidity” as an excuse for violating judicial conduct codes.297 But
stupidity can hardly explain why judges misuse their offices. First, it does
not take an unusually high IQ to grasp the idea there is no separate set of
rules for friends. Second, most judges found to have misused judicial
prestige receive disciplinary sanctions short of removal from office. 298 If
disciplinary commissions believed that special treatment for friends
demonstrates an intellectual inability to serve as a judge, every judge

295. In re Martin 245 S.E.2d 766, 773 (N.C. 1978) (“A trial judge cannot rely on his inexperience
or lack of training to excuse acts which tend to bring the judicial office into disrepute.”). But some
disciplinary bodies consider a judge’s incompetency or lack of legal education as a mitigating factor in
determining an appropriate sanction. See, e.g., In re Orsini, 181 A.2d 771, 772 (N.J. 1962) (considering
the fact that the judge was “ill-equipped for judicial office [and] was selected wholly upon political
considerations,” as a mitigating factor in a “ticket fixing” case); see also In re Sullivan, Amended Opinion
and Order 2 (Pa. Ct. of Judicial Discipline May 13, 2016) (considering as a mitigating factor that “Judge
Sullivan has no formal legal education and, naturally, does not have the appreciation for all of the finer
points of ethical standards one might expect of someone with such a background”)
http://www.pacourts.us/courts/court-of-judicial-discipline/court-cases/traffic-court-judge-michael-jsullivan-no-5-jd-14.
296. Bailey, 541 So. 2d at 1039; see also In re Boykin 763 So. 2d 872, 875 (Miss. 2000)
(“Negligence, ignorance, and incompetence are sufficient for a judge to behave in a manner prejudicial to
the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute.”).
297. See, e.g., In re Ellender, 889 So. 2d 225, 228 (La. 2004) (“Judge Ellender pleaded stupidity,
ignorance and lack of judgment . . . .”).
298. See infra Part V.B.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss2/2

34

McKoski: Disfavoring Justice

2018]

DISFAVORING JUSTICE

451

guilty of favoritism would be removed from office.299 Dispensing special
consideration to friends indicates an ethical deficiency rather than an
intellectual deficiency.300
C. Confusing Morality Roles
Judges serve in many roles in addition to the public role as a neutral
magistrate. Likely the most important of these non-professional stations
in life is that of a family member. As a judicial officer, an individual must
comply with the judiciary’s prime directive—fair, impartial, and unbiased
application of the law. As a parent, sibling, or child, a judge’s legal and
moral obligations are quite different. A parent, for instance, is entitled and
expected to show favoritism and partiality toward their children.
Unavoidably, the morality roles of a judge as public officer and as a
private family member sometimes conflict. For example, after receiving
a late-night telephone call from his son who had been arrested for
possession of cocaine, a judge ordered his son’s release on a recognizance
bond.301 Arguably, concern for his son’s safety overrode the judge’s
sworn legal and ethical duty not to preside in a relative’s case and not to
let family relationships influence judicial conduct.302 In other words, the
judge chose a moral obligation as a father over an oath as a judicial
officer. Less blatant, but equally improper, a New York judge made pleas
for leniency to a police officer and police chief concerning the arrest of
the judge’s son on animal cruelty charges.303 Although recognizing that
“parental instincts” sometimes cloud judicial judgement, the New York
Commission on Judicial Conduct refused to permit the judge’s moral role
as a father to justify violating the ethical duties assigned to members of
the judiciary.304
Judicial codes have long resolved conflicts in moral responsibilities by
specifically and repeatedly informing judges that they must keep parental
and other personal relationships separate from their judicial duties.305 For
example, Rule 1.3 of the 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct

299. See Steven Lubet, Stupid Judge Tricks, 41 S. TEXAS L. REV. at 1308-09 (2000).
300. Cf. Lawrence B. Solum, Judicial Selection: Ideology v. Character, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 659,
674 (2005).
301. In re Van Rider, 715 N.E.2d 402, 403 (Ind. 1999).
302. Id. at 404.
303. In re Sullivan, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct July 14, 2015).
304. Id; see also In re Brown, 761 So. 2d 182, 184 (Miss. 2000) (sanctioning a judge in part for
calling another judge to try to get his son’s DUI case dismissed).
305. See, e.g., CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 13 (Am. Bar Ass’n 1924) (“[A judge] should
not suffer his conduct to justify the impression that any person can improperly influence him or unduly
enjoy his favor, or that he is affected by the kinship, rank, position, or influence of any party or other
person.”).
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instructs judges not to abuse the prestige of office to advance the personal
or economic interests of others.306 Rule 2.2 of the 2007 ABA Model Code
provides that “[a] judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform
all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially.”307 Rule 2.4 squarely
addresses family and other relationships by warning judges not to “permit
family, social, political, financial, or other interests or relationships to
influence the judge’s judicial conduct or judgment.” 308 Finally, the 2007
ABA Code requires disqualification from any matter in which a family
member appears as a party, witness, or lawyer.309
Moreover, parental moral obligations do not explain violations of
unambiguous rules of judicial conduct prohibiting influence pedaling. A
parent’s moral obligation to their arrested child could be fulfilled by the
ethically permissible options of posting bond, hiring a top-flight criminal
defense team, or taking the matter to the “highest court in the land.”
Moreover, most judges who “help” a child with a legal problem by
violating the ethical prohibition against the misuse of prestige, simply feel
entitled to do so.310 Those same judges would not consider themselves
entitled to violate other ethics rules also designed to protect the integrity
of the judicial system such as the prohibitions against bribery and the
destruction of evidence.
Even if a deeply held sense of moral responsibility did explain a
judge’s misconduct in legal matters involving family members, it would
not explain identical misconduct in assisting non-relatives.311 Role
morality fits into structured relationships recognized by society “which
have some pattern of conduct associated with them.”312 These special
relationships carry responsibilities and expectations established by law,
tradition, and custom.313 Thus, relationships such as parent-child, teacherstudent, doctor-patient, lawyer-client, and judge-litigant carry certain
interpersonal expectations and responsibilities. But judges often misuse
judicial power and prestige where no special relationship exists. There is
simply no moral responsibility owed to a family member of an

306. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.3 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2007).
307. Id. R. 2.2.
308. Id. R. 2.4(B).
309. Id. R. 2.11(A)(2).
310. See infra Part IV.E.
311. See supra notes 124-142 (citing disciplinary actions in which a judge misused judicial power
or prestige to assist non-relatives).
312. DOROTHY EMMET, RULES, ROLES AND RELATIONS 169 (1966).
313. See id. at 14.
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acquaintance314 or a friend of the judge’s friend’s son.315
D. Narcissism
In some cases, flaunting ethical rules by dispensing judicial favors
could be attributed to a Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD).316 The
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5)
specifies eleven types of personality disorders, including Narcissistic
Personality Disorder.317 According to DSM-5, “[a] personality disorder is
an enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates
markedly from the expectations of the individual’s culture, is pervasive
and inflexible, has an onset in adolescence or early adulthood, is stable
over time, and leads to distress or impairment.”318 A diagnosis of NPD
requires the presence of at least five of the following diagnostic criteria:
1. A grandiose sense of self-importance;
2. Preoccupation with fantasies of unlimited success, power, or
brilliance;
3. A belief that he or she is “special” and unique;
4. Requires excessive admiration;
5. Possesses a sense of entitlement;
6. Takes advantage of others to further his or her own goals;
7. Lacks empathy;
8. Often envious of others or thinks other are envious of him or her;
and
9. Demonstrates arrogant, haughty behaviors or attitudes.319
Few judges have interposed a defense of NPD in a disciplinary
proceeding not only because narcissists are loathed to admit any fault 320
314. See In re Platt, (Cal. Comm’n on Judicial Performance Aug. 5, 2002) (disciplining a judge in
part for asking another judge to release a family member of an acquaintance of the judge on a recognizance
bond); see also In re Bowers, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Nov. 12, 2004)
(censuring a judge for requesting special consideration for a business acquaintance).
315. In re Kiley, 546 N.E.2d 916, 917 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1989).
316. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
669-72 (5th ed. 2013) (DSM-5).
317. Id. at 645.
318. Id. (italics omitted).
319. Id. at 669-70.
320. See DREW PINSKY AND S. MARK YOUNG, THE MIRROR EFFECT: HOW CELEBRITY
NARCISSISM IS SEDUCING AMERICA 100 (2009) (“[N]arcissists rarely have qualms about lying in order to
maintain their carefully constructed image, making it harder for a therapist to recognize where the patient’s
version of events leaves off and the real story begins.”); see also GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 647 (2003) (noting that narcissists are “prone to lie about themselves”). In addition, NPD is
difficult to diagnose. See PINSKY & YOUNG, supra, at 99-100 (discussing the difficulty in diagnosing

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

37

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 2

454

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 87

but also because NPD “is not readily amenable to treatment.”321
Therefore, by offering the diagnosis in response to a disciplinary
complaint, a judge almost certainly concedes the appropriateness of a long
suspension or permanent removal from office.322 One judge who took the
risk was George M. Parker.323
At his hearing before the Ohio Board of Commissioners on Grievances,
Judge Parker attempted to mitigate his misconduct by offering expert
testimony that he suffered from NPD.324 But Judge Parker’s demanding,
arrogant, and demeaning behavior greatly exceeded simply intervening in
cases to achieve a favorable outcome for a relative or friend. Among other
things, Judge Parker jailed a defendant’s mother for raising her hand to
ask a question;325 coerced guilty pleas;326 presided over a defendant’s
guilty plea and sentencing after witnessing law enforcement officials
seize the stolen property that formed the basis for the charge;327 took an
arresting officer into his chambers after recessing a trial, and proceeding
in an irritated, short-tempered, and agitated manner “slammed his hands
down in frustration” when the officer refused the judge’s demand to agree
to a reduced charge;328 engaged in boorish and humiliating treatment of a
domestic violence victim;329 called 911 to order a police officer to report
to the judge’s chambers in a non-emergency situation because the judge
thought no one at the police department would answer non-emergency
lines, and then falsely blamed the prosecutor for the telephone call and
later offered another false explanation for his action;330 telephoned a
defendant’s drug dealer from the courtroom;331 demanded to know why a
Jewish defendant attended a Catholic high school;332 and insisted that a
domestic violence victim state whether she “forgave” the offender.333
As Judge Parker’s conduct exhibited the classic signs of the disease, an
independent forensic psychiatrist had no difficulty concluding that the
NPD). One difficulty in diagnosing NPD is that there must be evidence of onset of the disorder in
adolescence or early adulthood, usually long before a person receives a judicial position. See DSM-5,
supra note 316, at 645.
321. Disciplinary Counsel v. Parker, 876 N.E.2d 556, 569 (Ohio 2007).
322. See id. at 574 (imposing an eighteen-month suspension from office).
323. Id. at 559 (stating that Judge Parker offered his diagnosis of narcissistic personality disorder
as a factor in mitigation)
324. Id. at 567-69.
325. Id. at 560-61.
326. Id. at 561-63.
327. Id. at 561.
328. Id. at 562.
329. Parker, 875 N.E.2d at 563.
330. Id. at 564-65.
331. Id. at 565.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 566.
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judge suffered from NPD.334 It did not take a trained eye to detect the
judge’s need to be admired, his grandiosity and bullying of
“subordinates,” his oversensitivity to what he considered slights to his
“special” position, his quickness to anger, his precise vision of a proper
case outcome and sense of entitlement to assure that outcome, and his
lack of empathy.335 Just as CEOs suffering from NPD can “suck the life
out of an organization,” it is easy to image Judge Parker sucking the life
out of a courtroom.336
Perfectly normal judges, just as other healthy individuals, occasionally
exhibit narcissistic traits.337 But these isolated occurrences do not control
the lives of most judges nor do they impair the judges’ ability to
objectively measure their conduct against applicable legal and ethical
standards.338 NPD appears infrequently in the population339 and cannot
explain the systematic misuse of judicial power.340 The more likely
explanation for this type of judicial misconduct lies in one of the
diagnostic criteria for NPD, a sense of entitlement.341
E. Psychological Entitlement
The “curse” of an unjustified sense of entitlement342 is often offered to
explain the improper actions and inactions of powerful people including
politicians, professional athletes, the wealthy, celebrities, union leaders,
and others.343 For some reason, a sense of entitlement has seldom been
334. Parker, 875 N.E.2d at 567-69.
335. See Jayne W. Barnard, Narcissism, Over-Optimism, Fear, Anger, and Depression: The
Interior Lives of Corporate Leaders, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 405, 410-11 (2008).
336. Id. at 410.
337. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 672 (5th ed. 2013) (DSM-5) (“Many highly successful individuals display personality traits
that might be considered narcissistic.”); see also DREW PINSKY AND S. MARK YOUNG, THE MIRROR
EFFECT: HOW CELEBRITY NARCISSISM IS SEDUCING AMERICA 89 (2009) (“All healthy individuals exhibit
narcissistic traits throughout their lives.”).
338. See PINSKY & YOUNG, supra note 337, at 90.
339. See id. at 97 (“[N]arcissism that can be definitively diagnosed and treated as a personality
disorder, is relatively rare.”); DSM-5, supra note 309, at 671 (stating that “prevalence estimates for
narcissistic personality disorder . . . range from 0% to 6.2% in community samples.”).
340. Disciplinary Counsel v. Parker, 876 N.E.2d 556, 569 (Ohio 2007).
341. See supra note 319 and accompanying text (listing the diagnostic criteria for NPD).
342. W. Keith Campbell, et al., Psychological Entitlement: Interpersonal Consequences and
Validation of a Self-Report Measure, 83 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 29, 30 (2004)
http://www.psychology.uga.edu/sites/default/files/PESentitlementPaper.pdf.
343. See id. at 29-30; see also Editorial, NY’s Entitled Pols, N.Y. POST, (May 30, 2017), at 22
(politicians); Danny Picard, John Farrell Will Be Fired by Red Sox Because of Player Entitlement,
METRO-BOSTON (May 25, 2017), 2017 WLNR 16395702 (professional athletes); John Tozzi, Income
Inequality Makes the Rich More Scrooge-Like, Study Finds, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, (Nov. 26, 2015), at 3
(wealthy); Corina Knoll & Richard Winton, Allred Again in Scandal’s Glare: Taking on Bill Cosby
Presents High Profile Attorney with Another Stint in the Spotlight Fighting for Women, L.A. TIMES, (Nov.
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suggested as the cause of the misdeeds of the most powerful governmental
officials on the planet—judges.344
In a sociological and political sense, power connotes “a relationship
with others that entails the ability to control their actions.”345 Otherwise
stated, power is ‘“a property possessed by an actor that enables him to
alter the will or actions of others so that they conform to his will.’”346 Not
surprisingly, persons in positions of power commonly possess an inflated
view of themselves, overestimate “the extent to which they actually
possess control over outcomes,” overestimate their positive personal
characteristics, and “adhere strictly to their own, pre-existing opinions
rather than incorporating the views of others.”347 Equally disturbing,
power leads to an enhanced sense of entitlement,348 “a stable and
pervasive sense that one deserves more and is entitled to more than
others.”349 Usually this means that affected individuals sincerely believe
that they are entitled to special treatment because of their status or
position in relation to “subordinates.”350 Those with an overactive sense
of entitlement are more likely to engage in unfair behavior, cheat, steal,
lie,351 hold grudges, and exhibit “a strong capacity for vengefulness.”352
Most significantly in the context of judges and judicial ethics codes,
entitled people “report greater unethical decision making tendencies and
behaviors.”353
A sense of entitlement is most dangerous when it accompanies a
position of almost absolute power to affect individuals, families,
government entities, businesses, and civic and charitable organizations

13, 2015), at 1 (celebrities); Editorial, Scott Walker is Dangerous: His Union-Bashing is All About the
Rich, PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE, (July 27, 2015), at A7 (union leaders).
344. Professor Steven Lubet was the first to recognize the role that a sense of entitlement plays in
a judge’s misuse of official power and prestige. See Lubet, Stupid Judge Tricks, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1301,
1310-11 (2000).
345. Marion Crain, Feminism, Labor, and Power, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1819, 1825 (1992).
346. Id. (quoting MARILYN FRENCH, BEYOND POWER: ON WOMEN, MEN AND MORALS 505
(1985)).
347. Takuya Sawaoka, Brent L. Hughes & Nalini Ambady, Power Heightens Sensitivity to
Unfairness Against the Self, 41 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 1023, 1023-24
(2015).
348. Id. at 1023.
349. W. Keith Campbell, et al., Psychological Entitlement: Interpersonal Consequences and
Validation of a Self-Report Measure, 83 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 29, 30-31 (2004)
http://www.psychology.uga.edu/sites/default/files/PESentitlementPaper.pdf.
350. See Joshua B. Grubbs & Julie J. Exline, Trait Entitlement: A Cognitive-Personality Source of
Vulnerability to Psychological Distress, 142 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN 1204, 1208, 1211 (2016).
351. Sawaoka, supra note 347, at 1024.
352. See Grubbs, supra note 350, at 1208, 1216.
353. Sawaoka, supra note 347, at 1024; see also Deborah L. Rhode, Lawyers as Leaders, 2010
MICH. ST. L. REV. 413, 419 (stating that entitled leaders may feel “free to disregard legal or ethical rules
and standards of respect that are applicable to others, to those ‘little people’”).
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in virtually every aspect of their existence. Since 1803, the judicial
system has had the last word on most issues. 354 Virtually every social,
political, and economic controversy finds its way to the courtroom
including who will serve as president,355 who can own guns,356 who can
get married,357 the design of cheerleading uniforms,358 and when parents
can visit their children.359 Typically, only judges holding office under the
federal constitution or a state constitution wield such vast power. Judges
in courts of limited jurisdiction possess severely circumscribed authority
to affect people’s lives. For example, the State of Washington statutorily
limits the jurisdiction of municipal court judges to city ordinances
violations and similar actions brought to enforce or recover penalties or
forfeitures established by city ordinances.360 Washington municipal court
judges may not sentence an offender to more than a $5,000 fine or 364
days in jail.361 But judges of limited authority exhibit a sense of
entitlement at least equal to judges invested with greater power. 362 Thus,
the degree of constitutional or statutory authority does not account for a
judge’s sense of entitlement or misuse of judicial prestige. Judges attain
their “special” status and sense of entitlement in many ways independent
of the amount of authority they possess over the lives of others.
1. Becoming Entitled
The unique power and prestige accompanying the judicial office
render judges the most susceptible to developing and acting upon a
misplaced sense of entitlement.
a. Unchallenged Authority in the Courtroom
Most basically, the titles “Judge” and “Your Honor” connote a special,
superior position to everyone else in a courtroom who must rise when the
judge enters. The superiority of the judge is constantly reinforced by
354. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (establishing the doctrine of judicial review).
355. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
356. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
357. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
358. See Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017).
359. See In re Marriage of Marshall, 663 N.E.2d 1113, 1119 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (“Matters of child
visitation privileges rest largely in the broad discretion of the trial court . . . .”).
360. WASH. REV. CODE § 35.20.030 (2016); see also Janet G. Cornell, Limited Jurisdiction CourtsChallenges, Opportunities, and Strategies for Action, TRENDS ST. CTS. (2012) (“Forty-six states have
clearly identified limited-jurisdiction courts.”) http://www.ncsc.org/sitecore/content/microsites/futuretrends-2012/home/courts-and-the-community/3-6-limited-jurisdiction-courts.aspx.
361. WASH. REV. CODE § 35.20.030 (2016).
362. See, e.g., In re Sullivan, Order (Pa. Ct. of Judicial Discipline Jan. 13, 2016) (Philadelphia
Traffic Court Judge); In re Boykin, 763 So. 2d 872, 874 (Miss. 2000) (Justice Court Judge).
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uniformly recognized symbols of power including the judge’s elevated
seating, robe, gavel, and the flags and governmental seal flanking the
judge. Supplicants sit in church like pews waiting acknowledgement by
the person unmistakably in charge.363 No one in the courtroom refers to
the judge by his or her name because the judge is no longer a mere mortal
but the embodiment of the law and symbolic dispenser of justice. 364 In
other words, “judges become . . . not ordinary men, subject to ordinary
passions, but ‘discoverers’ of final truth, priests in the service of a
godhead.”365
Because “[a] courtroom is a hallowed place where trials must proceed
with dignity,”366 judges possess nearly absolute authority to direct and
control what transpires in court.367 Sometimes, judges unjustifiably
demand deferential treatment commensurate with their “enlarged sense of
self-importance” and entitlement.368 A judge’s stern warning369 or the
approach of a court security officer quickly serves to reprimand
individuals instigating affronts or perceived affronts to the judge. If
deemed necessary, a judge may unilaterally cite an offender for direct
criminal contempt and impose a sentence. If the sentence includes
immediate incarceration, the court security officer will execute the order
without question because the courtroom hierarchy is never in doubt.370 A
judge’s unqualified control over the courthouse and the people in it has
led some judges to declare that, at least when on the bench, they are
God.371 Further enhancing a judge’s sense of entitlement is the deference
afforded judges by the civil justice system.
363. Orlando I. Martinez-Garcia, The Person in Law, The Number in Math: Improved Analysis of
the Subject as Foundation for a Nouveau Regime, 18 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & LAW 503, 513
(2010) (noting that the organization and structure of many courtrooms “are similar to those of the church
and ancient temple”).
364. See Oscar G. Chase & Jonathan Thong, Judging Judges: The Effect of Courtroom Ceremony
on Participant Evaluation of Process Fairness-Related Factors, 24 YALE L.J. & HUMAN. 221, 226 (2012)
(“The judge's robe and the other ceremonial symbols of the courtroom are in this sense “social signs” that
the judge has put aside her individuality and assumed the role of an authority acting “under law”— that
is, deciding according to neutral principles.”).
365. Max Lerner, Constitution and Courts as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290, 1312 (1937).
366. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 351 (1970) (Douglas, J., separate opinion).
367. See United States v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 497 F.2d 102, 106-07 (5th Cir. 1974)
(“Ordinarily the trial judge has extremely broad discretion to control courtroom activity . . . .”); State v.
Castoran, 739 A.2d 97, 99 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1999) (stating that a judge has “wide discretion” to control the
courtroom).
368. Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior, and Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 853, 881 (1995).
369. See, e.g., In re Hammermaster, 985 P.2d 924, 929 (Wash. 1999) (en banc) (reporting that a
judge told a defendant, “shut up before you go to jail”).
370. Cf. infra notes 386-387 and accompanying text (describing how police officers literally
followed a judge’s order to bring an attorney before the court using excessive force).
371. See, e.g., Gottlieb v. SEC, 310 Fed. Appx. 424, 425 (2d Cir. 2009) (reporting that a judge told
a litigant “I am God in my courtroom”); Pamela Coyle, Benchstress, 81 A.B.A.J., Dec. 1995, 60, 60
(reporting that a Louisiana judge told a witness that in court he was God).
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b. Immunity from Civil Lawsuits
The doctrine of judicial immunity further increases a sense of
entitlement by immunizing judges from any personal monetary
consequences for their official actions.372 So long as a judge acts in his or
her judicial capacity and has not acted in “the clear absence of all
jurisdiction,”373 the judge is protected against a suit for money
damages.374 Absolute judicial immunity is justified by the legitimate
concern that “[i]f judges were personally liable for erroneous decisions,
the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous but vexatious,
would provide powerful incentives for judges to avoid rendering
decisions likely to provoke such suits.”375 The doctrine permits judges to
decide cases without fear that they will wind up as defendants in lawsuits
filed by disgruntled litigants.376 The enormously broad scope of judicial
immunity defeats liability even when a judge acts maliciously or
corruptly,377 deprives a party of due process,378 acts on bias and bad
faith,379 or causes an injustice.380 Thus, judicial immunity bars money
damage lawsuits when a judge in bad faith considers ex parte
communications,381 refuses to stay a jail sentence as mandated by state
law,382 or receives a bribe.383 As illustrated by Mireles v. Waco,384 judicial
immunity even protects a judge who, because of a touch of narcissism or
hypersensitivity to perceived affronts, causes physical harm to a
372. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347-48 (1871).
373. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978). Sparkman provides the following example
distinguishing an act in excess of jurisdiction from an act in clear absence of all jurisdiction:
“[I]f a probate judge, with jurisdiction over only wills and estates, should try a
criminal case, he would be acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction and would not
be immune from liability for his action; on the other hand, if a judge of a criminal
court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting
in excess of his jurisdiction and would be immune.”
Id. at 357 n.7 (citing Bradley v. Fisher 80 U.S. 335, 352 (1872)).
374. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988).
375. Id. at 226-27.
376. Id. at 225.
377. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
378. Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 443-45 (3d Cir. 2000).
379. Marangos v. Swett, No. 3:07-cv-5937-FLW, 2008 WL 4508753, *8 (D. N.J. Sept. 29, 2008)
(finding that judicial immunity applies even when the judicial act is motivated by “bias, bad faith, or
malice”).
380. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 10 (1991).
381. Marangos, 2008 WL 4508753, *8.
382. Figueroa, 208 F.3d at 443-45.
383. See, e.g., Estate of Sherman v. Almeida, 747 A.2d 470, 475 (R.I. 2000) (refusing to carve out
an exception to the judicial immunity doctrine for bribery or other forms of judicial corruption).
384. 502 U.S. 9 (1991).
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courtroom participant.
Howard Waco, an assistant public defender sued Raymond Mireles, a
California state judge.385 Waco’s complaint alleged that when he failed to
appear for a case on the judge’s morning calendar, the judge
unceremoniously ordered police officers “to forcibly and with excessive
force seize and bring [Waco] into his courtroom.”386 As a natural
consequence of the judge’s power and prestige:
[t]he officers took the order literally and “by means of unreasonable
force and violence seize[d] plaintiff and remove[d] him backwards”
from another courtroom where he was waiting to appear, cursed him,
and called him “vulgar and offensive names,” then “without
necessity slammed” him through the doors and swinging gates into
Judge Mireles' courtroom.387
The Court found that Judge Mireles’s action to secure Waco’s attendance
in court was clearly taken in the judge’s judicial capacity. 388 The Court
further determined that even if the judge authorized and ratified the use
of excessive force, that act, while in excess of the judge’s authority, was
not taken in the absence of the court’s jurisdiction.389 As a result, judicial
immunity barred the suit.390 Judicial immunity from civil suits for money
damages serves a laudatory purpose but also heightens a judge’s sense of
invulnerably and entitlement.
c. Special Status as a Lawyer
Judges who are lawyers start their professional careers with a special
status mindset that is only magnified when they put on the robe.391
Lawyers receive special training in law schools, take a unique oath, and
belong to a “special professional order.”392 “From their earliest origins the
law has accorded to these ‘officers of the court’ certain special and
exclusive privileges, which set them apart from the mass of the people, as

385. Id. at 10.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 12-13.
389. Id.
390. Id. at 13.
391. See Jeffrey O'Connell & Thomas E. O'Connell, Book Review, Stewards of Democracy: Law
as a Public Profession by Paul D. Carrington, 16 J.L & POL. 479, 494 (2000) (describing judges as having
been “nurtured in an ambience of special status and preferment from their earliest days in law school”).
392. Michael Ariens, Know the Law: A History of Legal Specialization, 45 S.C. L. REV. 1003, 1031
(1994).
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if they truly were, in a strict sense, public officials.”393
Apparently, willing to sacrifice humility for accuracy, lawyers
consider themselves conservators of democracy,394 bearers of the public
trust,395 and guardians of justice.396 They do not hesitate to remind the
public of their special status:
We are special. We are in the Constitution. We are officers of the
court. We are fiduciaries whose charge is to preserve the rule of law.
We have kept the playing fields level and made sure that people were
honest in the market place for over 200 years. We, lawyers and
judges, have provided the glue that has held the fabric of this country
together, and have contributed in great measure to the success of an
economic system and a democratic form of government that is the
envy of the world. We have literally been and are the guardians of
this Republic.397
This self-proclaimed exalted position in society leads lawyers to exhibit
their own sense of entitlement.398 Some from the special lawyer class are
drawn to the judiciary to increase their power and prestige, which also
increases their sense of entitlement.399
d. Reinforcing a Judge’s Sense of Entitlement
Unfortunately, a judge’s sense of entitlement is continually reinforced.
Reinforcement comes in innocent ways such as a lawyer laughing at a
judge’s jokes, or automatically agreeing with observations made by a
judge, or addressing a judge as “Judge” or “Your Honor” during
extrajudicial encounters. Judicial codes of conduct also unwittingly foster
a judge’s feeling of self-importance on and off the bench. Judicial codes
recognize a judge’s “special expertise,”400 and that their special status
393. Id. at 1013 n.46 (quoting ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE
LAW 3 (1921)).
394. Renee Newman Knake, Lawyer Speech in the Regulatory State, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2099,
2114 (2016).
395. Jo Ann Merica, Welcome to the Profession, 62 TEX. B.J., Jan. 1999, at 41, 41.
396. Lawyers/Community Leaders, TEX. B.J., Apr. 2005, at 364, 364.
397. Jack F. Dunbar, Multidisciplinary Practice Translated Means “Let’s Kill All the Lawyers,” 79
MICH. BAR J., Jan. 2000, at 64, 66.
398. See Richard L. Abel, Comparative Studies of Lawyer Deviance and Discipline, 15 LEGAL
ETHICS 187, 189 (2012) (“Many lawyers seemed to have a sense of entitlement to what they pocketed,
justifying it by reference to the effort they invested, the expertise they had painfully acquired, or the
rewards reaped by other (less deserving) lawyers.”).
399. Linz Audain, The Economics of Law-Related Labor: Judicial Careers, Judicial Selection, and
an Agency Cost Model of the Judicial Function, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 115, 120 (1992).
400. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.2 cmt. 1 (Am. Bar. Ass’n 2007).
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requires judges to subject themselves to professional and personal
restrictions that would be “burdensome” if applied to normal people.401
Under rules of judicial conduct “[i]t is well accepted that a judge is a judge
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, whether the judge is wearing
a judicial robe or not in any activity.”402 A former federal judge described
the judiciary’s exalted position in society:
Judges are regarded by the public as the custodians of a special body
of knowledge. Like Egyptian priests who held within their bosoms
the secret of the Nile, so the judges, it is believed, possess
knowledge and modes of reasoning unavailable to the laity. For that
reason they are treated with a very special deference and, sometimes,
with reverence. This peculiar and special relationship between the
public and the judge is an important ingredient of his capacity to
render the service expected of him by the public.403
The judiciary’s high opinion of itself, enhanced by the deference and
flattery of lawyers, and the special status conferred by judicial conduct
codes, all reinforce a sense of judicial entitlement. But the most important
factor in solidifying an unjustified sense of entitlement is allowing a
judge’s misuse of judicial prestige to go unchallenged. For example, it
took nine years before the pattern of misuse of prestige by former Illinois
Supreme Court Justice James D. Heiple came to light.
On January 27, 1996, at approximately 1:30 a.m., a police officer
attempted to stop Justice Heiple for traveling thirteen miles per hour over
the speed limit.404 Although the officer activated his emergency lights and
siren, and there were no vehicles between the officer’s squad car and
Justice Heiple’s vehicle, Justice Heiple continued for three blocks before
pulling to the side of the road. After stopping on the shoulder, Justice
Heiple ignored the officer’s order to remain at the scene and drove three
blocks to his residence.405 The officer followed and upon arriving at the
Justice’s home asked him to remain near his car. Again, ignoring the
officer’s instruction, Justice Heiple began walking toward his front
door.406 When asked to stop, Justice Heiple responded, “[o]h shut up. Do
you know who you are talking to?”407 While the officers placed him in

401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.

See id. at R. 1.2 cmt. 2.
Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 2007-07 (2007).
Simon H. Rifkind, A Judge's Nonjudicial Behavior, 38 N.Y. ST. B.J. 22, 22-23 (1966).
In re Heiple, Order (Ill. Cts. Comm'n Apr. 30, 1997).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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handcuffs, he repeated, “[d]o you know who I am?”408 During its
investigation into Justice Heiple’s arrest, the Illinois Judicial Inquiry
Board discovered three previous traffic stops in which the Justice
successfully interposed his judicial status to avoid traffic citations.409
About three weeks before the January 27, 1996 arrest, Justice Heiple
was stopped for speeding.410 As the officer approached Justice Heiple’s
automobile, Justice Heiple displayed his Illinois Supreme Court
identification card instead of his driver’s license.411 For that reason, the
officer did not issue Justice Heiple a traffic ticket.412 Similarly, in
November 1995, Justice Heiple displayed his official identification card
when asked by a police officer for his driver’s license.413 By invoking his
judicial status, Justice Heiple again avoided a ticket for traveling twentyeight miles per hour in excess of the speed limit.414 Three years earlier,
Justice Heiple again displayed his judicial identification when stopped for
speeding.415 During that stop, he also advised the law enforcement officer
that as a former traffic court judge, he was well aware of the traffic
laws.416 Although, on that occasion, Justice Heiple could not produce
current proof of vehicle insurance, he was not issued any citations.417
Using the prestige of judicial office at least three times to avoid the
consequences of his misconduct served to fortify Justice Heiple’s
misplaced sense of entitlement. In his mind, he received from the first
three police officers only what he was entitled to because of his special
status as a member of the state’s highest court. Police officers might have
a right to subject commoners to the laws of the state, but not those of
special, superior status such as judges. This is not to fault the three officers
who gave Justice Heiple a pass. But Justice Heiple’s disturbing actions
during his fourth traffic stop on January 27, 1996, can be best understood
as a sense of entitlement to special treatment that he expected, and usually
received, from persons of “inferior” status.418

408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Many judges misuse their official power and prestige for years before being called to account.
See, e.g., In re Schilling, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct May 8, 2012) (noting that
Judge Schilling bragged about the withdrawal of a ticket he received in 2005).
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e. A Sense of Entitlement Accounts for the Misuse of Judicial
Power and Prestige
There is little doubt that most judges who dispense or request favors
for themselves or others do so because they believe that their judicial
status entitles them to special treatment.419 Usually, the connection is
established by the judge’s own words.420 Thus, when Justice Heiple asked
the officer effectuating a traffic stop, “[d]o you know who I am?” he was
not expecting the officer to respond, “yes, I know, you are a lawyer” or,
“you reside in the city” or “you belong to the Rotary Club.” Justice Heiple
held only one position or status that entitled him to exemption from the
law—judge.421
Similarly, after Judge Carl J. Landicino handed a police officer his
judicial identification card and informed the officer that he was driving
back from a judicial conference, the judge inquired, “is this how you treat
a Supreme Court Judge?”422 Judge Landicino did not ask, “is this how you
treat a citizen,” or “family man,” or “community volunteer,” because
those statuses entitle a person only to fair treatment, not special treatment.
When Judge Roy M. Dumar appeared in small claims court to prosecute
a case against a snowmobile dealer, he introduced himself to the court not
as plaintiff Dumar, but Judge Dumar, because judges, not plaintiffs,
deserve a leg up on non-judges.423 When Judge David M. Wiater
telephoned a defendant to reprimand him for leaving an unpleasant
message for the court clerk, the judge emphasized that the defendant was
talking to a New York judge and not a next-door neighbor.424 Some judges
are a little more emphatic when asserting their positions of authority and
entitlement. For example, to avoid paying an entry fee to a park a judge

419. See Elisa E. Ugarte, Response to Stupid Judge Tricks, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1407, 1409 (2000)
(agreeing that judges exhibit a sense of entitlement in many acts of misconduct).
420. The evidence sometimes comes from the judge’s own hand rather than the judge’s mouth.
Offering a traffic enforcement officer, a judicial badge or identification card in addition to, or instead of,
a driver’s license is a convenient way to claim judicial privilege. See, e.g., In re Werner, Determination
(N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Oct. 1, 2002).
421. In re Heiple, Order (Ill. Cts. Comm'n Apr. 30, 1997); see also In re Knott, Formal Written
Complaint (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Sept. 14, 2012) (charging that the judge asked the police
office “Do you know who I am,” after being served with a ticket for leaving the scene of an accident); In
re Sharp (Tex. Comm’n on Judicial Performance Mar. 13, 2013) (finding that in an effort to secure the
release of an acquaintance’s daughter, the judge asked juvenile detention officials, “[D]o you know who
you are talking too, you better release her tonight!”).
422. In re Landicino, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Dec. 28, 2015). The
“supreme court” in New York is a state-wide trial level court. Jay C. Carlisle & Matthew J. Shock, The
Constitutional Convention and Court Merger in New York State, 38 PACE L. REV. 69, 77 (2017).
423. See In re Dumar, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Apr. 18, 2004).
424. In re Wiater, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct June 29, 2006) (finding that
the judge advised the defendant, “[y]ou’re talking to a New York State Judge . . . not somebody next
door”).
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offered, “I’m the fucking judge here in this village.” 425 With similar
emphasis, another judge reminded police that, “[m]y name is not Mr.
Quinn; it's Judge Quinn and don't forget it.”426 And while some judges do
not wear their official positions on their sleeves, their thought process in
invoking judicial prestige in private matters is the same. The
circumstances surrounding the misuse of power and prestige by judges
confirm the over-developed sense of psychological entitlement that
causes judges to exploit their powerful and prestigious position for private
gain.
V. CURTAILING THE ABUSE OF JUDICIAL POWER AND PRESTIGE
Identifying a problem is always easier than solving the problem. That
certainly is the case with the abuse of the judicial office. But as with most
shortcomings in the behavior of judges, the solution begins with
education.
A. Judicial Education
Every state educates its judges in matters of judicial ethics.427 So far,
however, educational efforts have failed to convince a significant number
of judges to limit the use of judicial power and prestige to their official
duties.428 That may be because education programs concerning the
exploitation of the judicial office are poorly conceived. It also may be that
judicial educators consider the prohibition against things like ticket-fixing
as too obvious to warrant mention. Or it may be that educators fear
insulting judges by implying that judges need education on the subject.
But as demonstrated by the steady stream of judges disciplined for
misusing judicial power and prestige, a tough love approach is necessary
to combat the problem.429
Educational sessions on the misuse of the judicial office should begin
with an examination of relevant judicial code provisions and a discussion
425. In re Pennington, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Nov. 3, 2003).
426. In re Quinn, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct May 1, 1981).
427. See, e.g., FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.320(b)(2) (2010) (requiring that judges attend four hours of
ethics training every three years); KAN. SUP. CT. R. 501 (2013) (requiring two hours of judicial ethics
training each year); OHIO GOV. JUD. R. IV § 3(C) (2015) (requiring at least two hours of instruction
relating to judicial ethics and professionalism every two years); N.D. SUP. CT. ADMIN. R. 4(a) (2011)
(requiring three hours of judicial ethics training every three years); R.I. RULE 3.2(b) (“The on-going study
of judicial ethics shall be required of all judges.”); see also The State of the Society and Our Thanks to
Dave Richert, 94 JUDICATURE 257, 257 (2011) (reporting that Cynthia Gray, Director of the American
Judicature Society Center for Judicial Ethics, conducted training sessions for judges in ten states in 2010).
428. See supra Parts III.A. & III.B.
429. See infra Part V.B. (suggesting suspension or removal from office for judges who misuse their
power or prestige to interfere with adjudicatory or investigatory proceedings).
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of the reasons that a “two-tier” court system is inimical to the rule of law.
For states adopting the 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, the
paramount provision is Rule 1.3, which provides, “[a] judge shall not
abuse the prestige of judicial office to advance the personal or economic
interests of the judge or others, or allow others to do so.”430 Comment 1
to Rule 1.3 applies the rule to a judge’s attempt to use the prestige of
office to avoid a traffic ticket.431 Comment 1 also provides an opportunity
to inform judges attending the training session that interjecting the
judicial office into a traffic stop, even absent a judge’s specific request
for special treatment, violates Rule 1.3.432 The ethics instructor should
explain that no exception to the abuse of prestige prohibition permits
judges to interfere in a family member or friend’s legal problems.433 An
examination of the facts surrounding the discipline of judges for misusing
their power or prestige could illustrate the application of the relevant
conduct code provisions. Ideally, the session would close with a
presentation by a judge who had been disciplined for abusing judicial
prestige. This first-person account would serve to enlighten the program
participants about the circumstances of the judge’s offense, the judge’s
thought process (or lack thereof) when committing the violation, the
financial and emotional costs on the judge and the judge’s family, and a
blow-by-blow account of the disciplinary process.
Focusing a segment of a judge’s formal education in the manner
suggested carries obvious advantages. First, judges will learn both the
rules and the real-life consequences of violating the rules governing the
misuse of judicial power and prestige. Second, the abuse of judicial status
to obtain a personal benefit will be revealed for what it really is—an
invidious form of corruption. Third, the educational program will make
judges confront the damage to public confidence in the judicial system
caused by favoritism. No longer will the “fixed matter” merely be an
inconsequential speeding ticket, a victimless relaxation of the rules of
procedure,434 or a matter of professional curtesy.435 Fourth, judges will
leave the ethics session determined to avoid the embarrassment of being
the next judge assigned to address seminar participants with a personal
430. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.3 (Am. Bar. Ass’n 2007).
431. Id. cmt. 1.
432. See Raymond J. McKoski, Judicial Discipline and the Appearance of Impropriety: What the
Public Sees, Is What the Judge Gets, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1914, 1970-71 (2010).
433. See In re Canary, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Dec. 26, 2002) (stating
that parental instincts do not excuse violations of judicial ethics).
434. See In re Dixon, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct May 26, 2016) (Emery,
concurring) (describing a judge’s attempt to influence another judge’s decision as “except for our system
of law itself” victimless).
435. See In re Maney, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Dec. 20, 2010) (finding
that a judge requested special treatment from a police officer as a “professional courtesy”).
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story of the exploitation of judicial office. Finally, attendance at a training
session like one proposed could serve as a factor in aggravation at a
disciplinary hearing for a judge who subsequently uses or attempts to use
official prestige to gain a personal advantage.436
The Texas Municipal Courts Education Center has produced a webinar
titled, “Ticket-Fixing: Public Safety and Corruption,” which addresses
ticket-fixing in the context of a judge’s ethical, moral, professional, and
legal responsibilities.437 By using media reports of specific cases in which
judges granted favorable case dispositions for friends and relatives, the
webinar presents the misuse of judicial prestige as a betrayal of public
trust. It also cautions judges to remain alert for the ticket-fixing escapades
of other constituents of the criminal justice system such as law
enforcement officials, court clerks, and lawyers.438 An expanded version
of the Texas program could cover, in addition to ticket-fixing, the other
equally serious ways in which judges misuse their offices.
Regrettably, judicial education will not alone solve the problem.439
Sometimes getting the attention of judges is as important as educating
judges.
B. Getting Judges’ Attention
The judiciary and judicial disciplinary bodies have failed to convince
judges of the seriousness of diverting their official power and prestige to
gain a personal advantage for themselves or others.440 Disciplinary bodies
repeatedly and emphatically denounce a two-tier court system,
highlighting ticket-fixing judges as the poster children for corruption.441
436. See In re Perrin, 10 CC 2, Order (Ill. Cts. Comm’n Sept. 9, 2011) (Wolff, dissenting)
(suggesting that the fact that a judge had received ethics training concerning improper ex parte
communications could enhance the judge’s discipline for subsequent ex parte communications); In re
Martin, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Dec. 26, 2001) (noting that the judge had
attended judicial education classes and had received judicial ethics advisory opinions that emphasized the
impropriety of engaging in ex parte communications and misusing judicial prestige).
437. RYAN KELLUS TURNER, TICKET-FIXING: PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRUPTION (Tex. Courts
Education Ctr. 2010) (slides 13-31) http://www.tmcec.com/public/files/File/Webinars/2009-10/Ticketfixing.pdf.
438. Id. See also Orange County Court Clerk Pleads Guilty to Illegally Fixing More Than 1,000
DUI, Traffic Cases, ORANGE COUNTY (CAL.) REGISTER, Mar. 29, 2017, 2017 WLNR 9900506; Editorial,
The Ticket-Fixing Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2011, at A26 (reporting the arrest of eleven New York
Police Officers charged with fixing tickets).
439. See In re Stanford, Order of Removal (Cal. Comm’n on Judicial Performance Jan. 11, 2012)
(emphasizing that the judge diverted friends’ tickets to his courtroom and waived or suspended fines even
after attending judicial education programs that included summaries of cases involving ticket fixing).
440. See Cynthia Gray, Lax Practices, JUDICIAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT BLOG (June 28, 2016)
(“Despite numerous cases sanctioning judges for the practice . . . ticket-fixing remains a persistent,
sometimes even systemic problem), https://ncscjudicialethicsblog.org/2016/06/.
441. See In re Aluzzi, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct June 26, 2017) (“[T]icket-
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Nevertheless, when it comes to disciplining judges, the punishment falls
far short of the rhetoric. For example, discipline for ticket-fixing in
Mississippi historically included a fine, assessment of costs, and a public
reprimand.442 Thus, in Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance
v. Gunn, the Mississippi Supreme Court took a “firm stance” against
ticket-fixing by giving a judge a public reprimand and a $400 fine.443 The
court noted that it “has frequently imposed the penalty of a public
reprimand and fine for the offense of ticket fixing.” 444 The fine and
reprimand sanction simply failed to convince Mississippi judges to
conform their conduct to ethical requirements.445 As a result, the
Mississippi Supreme Court adopted a new approach for disciplining
judges for ticket-fixing. Under this new approach, the court imposed a
public reprimand and costs of the proceeding, as well as required the
judge to pay the fines for improperly dismissed tickets.446 The court
agreed with the position taken by the Mississippi Commission on Judicial
Performance that “if judges have to pay the fines for the tickets they
improperly dismiss, such sanctions will deter this behavior in the
future.”447 Under this new disciplinary scheme, Judge Sherlene B. Boykin
received a public reprimand, was assessed costs of the proceeding, and
was fined $861.50, the sum the court determined was lost when the judge
fixed eleven tickets.448
Doomed from the start, the Mississippi Supreme Court’s enhanced
sanction did not persuade judges to stop fixing tickets.449 Equating the
harm of ticket-fixing with lost revenue simply misses the point. The
public injury lies not in the government’s loss of funds but in the judge’s
decision to abandon judicial neutrality and pervert the justice system to
benefit a favored individual. A check from a judge’s bank account cannot
reimburse the public for that wrong. Unfortunately, Mississippi’s reliance
on public reprimands to address misuse of the judicial office is not
unusual. In the absence of extreme aggravating factors, most jurisdictions
fixing results in “two systems of justice, one for the average citizen and another for people with
influence.”) (quoting FIXING-TICKETS, supra note 103, at 16)).
442. See In re Williams, 880 So. 2d 343, 347 (Miss. 2004) (“Often the sanction for “fixing” tickets
is a public reprimand, fine, and assessment of costs.”).
443. In re Gunn, 614 So. 2d 387, 389, 391 (Miss. 1993).
444. Id. at 390.
445. See, e.g., In re Hearn, 515 So. 2d 1225 (Miss. 1987) (imposing a public reprimand and fine
against Judge Hearn for fixing 93 tickets from March 1985 until March 1986); In re Hearn, 542 So. 2d
901, 902 (Miss. 1989) (removing Judge Hearn for continuing to engage in the practice of ticket-fixing in
97 cases from May 1987 until March 1988).
446. In re Boykin, 763 So. 2d 872, 876 (Miss. 2000).
447. Id.
448. Id. at 874, 876. The court apparently assumed that there would have been a finding of guilty
on the tickets improperly dismissed by the judge.
449. See supra, notes 247-255 and accompanying text.
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reprimand or censure judges for improperly asserting their official
positions in private matters.450 In many cases, these admonishments are
private.451 Although New York disciplinary opinions repeatedly caution
judges that “even a single incident of ticket-fixing is ‘misconduct of such
gravity as to warrant removal,’”452 in reality, New York judges are seldom
removed from office for misusing judicial power or prestige.453
The “bark” of courts and disciplinary commissions is appropriately
severe. Their “bite” is nonexistent, or at best, insufficient to focus the
attention of judges on the devastating effect of their misconduct on public
confidence in the judiciary. Engagement in the judicial disciplinary
process is a traumatic experience for most judges. However, ending the
process with a paper chastisement minimizes the seriousness of the
offense. It is time that the punishment fit the rhetoric and the crime. In
most circumstances this means a mandatory suspension for a judge 454 who
misuses official power or prestige to influence or attempt to influence
either a legal proceeding or the official conduct of a law enforcement
officer or other public official.455 The need for suspended judges to
450. See, e.g., supra, note 217 (citing disciplinary cases).
451. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, ANNUAL REPORT 2013, at
20 (2014) (summarizing the private admonishments issued to California judges in 2013); IDAHO JUDICIAL
COUNCIL, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, GOVERNOR, AND SUPREME COURT 2015, at 14 (reporting the
private reprimand of a judge charged with the misuse of judicial prestige).
452. In re Hunt, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Nov. 9, 2011) (quoting In re
Reedy, 475 N.E.2d 1262, 1263 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1985)); see also In re Aluzzi, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n
on Judicial Conduct June 26, 2017) (“We emphasize that ticket-fixing will not be tolerated and that any
such conduct will be condemned with strong measures, including, in appropriate circumstances in the
future, the sanction of removal.”).
453. See, e.g., In re Canary, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Dec. 26, 2002)
(censuring a judge who (1) twice angrily intervened with police in connection with his son’s arrest; (2)
asserted his judicial status in attempts to have his son’s charges dismissed; (3) pushed an officer; (4)
“officially” requested a favor to keep his son’s arrest out of the newspapers; and (5) told the arresting
officer that the judge would throw out any tickets written by the officer’s department); In re Landicino,
Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Dec 28, 2015) (censuring a judge for D.U.I.; leading
the police on a two-mile high-speed pursuit; and “repeatedly asserting his judicial status to receive
favorable treatment”). See also In re Cook, Determination (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Aug. 31,
2005) (Emery, dissenting) (criticizing the sanction of censure as too lenient); In re Aluzzi, Determination
(N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct June 26, 2017) (censuring a judge for attempting to fix tickets).
454. The judicial disciplinary agencies of ten states lack authority to impose a suspension from
office as a sanction. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, AVAILABLE SANCTIONS IN JUDICIAL
DISCIPLINE PROCEEDINGS, tbl. III. (updated June 2015) (identifying ten states that do not authorize
“suspension
without
pay”
as
a
disciplinary
sanction)
http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Center%20for%20Judicial%20Ethics/Sanctions_tables_
2015.ashx. For example, New York judges cannot be suspended from office because the New York State
Constitution only authorizes the state commission on judicial conduct to admonish, censure, or remove
an errant judge. N.Y. CONSTITUTION, art. VI, § 22.
455. The misuse of judicial prestige in other than adjudicative or investigatory matters may warrant
a lesser sanction than suspension. For example, some jurisdictions consider it a misuse of prestige for a
judge to ask a fellow church member to buy a ticket to their congregation’s fund-raising dinner. See, e.g.,
Ark. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 94-03 (1994). Assuming this type of “solicitation” constitutes
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explain to neighbors and family members why they are not going to work;
the embarrassing contacts with lawyers, judges, and court officials during
the suspension; concern about reelection or reappointment; and a loss of
a steady paycheck may more effectively signal to the offending judge,
other judges, and court personnel456 that placing a thumb on the scales of
justice has real consequences.
C. Suspension from Official Duties
Suspending judges for abusing judicial power and prestige to affect
adjudicatory and investigatory proceedings serves two principal purposes.
First, the suspension signals to both the public and to the judiciary that
favoritism will not be tolerated. Second, a period of suspension from
office provides an opportunity for the disciplined judge and the judicial
system to address the deficiencies in the judge’s thinking, personality, or
psyche that prevent him from complying with judicial conduct rules. To
accomplish this second goal, the period of suspension should include
psychological evaluation and testing. If, for instance, a judge’s conduct
shows signs of a narcissistic personality, the psychologist chosen to
conduct the evaluation could administer assessment tools such as the
Narcissistic Personality Inventory457 and the Hypersensitive Narcissism
Scale.458 Similarly, the six-item entitlement subscale of the Narcissistic
Personality Inventory459 and the Psychological Entitlement Scale460
would assist in confirming whether a sense of entitlement contributed to
a judge’s misconduct. The Psychological Entitlement Scale, for example,
asks the client to express a numerical degree of agreement or

an abuse of judicial prestige, a suspension from office would constitute overkill for the public or private
harm, if any, caused by the “solicitation.”
456. Court personnel other than judges fix tickets. See, e.g., Anh Do & Richard Winton, O.C’s
Illegally Fixed Court Cases Adding Up to ‘Big Time Corruption,’ L.A. TIMES (June 20, 2015) (reporting
that
a
court
clerk
illegally
resolved
a
thousand
traffic
cases)
http://www.latimes.com/local/orangecounty/la-me-oc-fixed-tickets-20150620-story.html.
457. The forty question Narcissistic Personality Inventory is available at http://personalitytesting.info/printable/narcissistic-personality-inventory.pdf.
458. The Hypersensitive Narcissism Scale is included as an appendix to W. Keith Campbell, et. al.,
Psychological Entitlement: Interpersonal Consequences and Validation of a Self-Report Measure, 83 J.
PERSONALITY
ASSESSMENT
29,
45
(app.
B)
(2004)
http://www.psychology.uga.edu/sites/default/files/PESentitlementPaper.pdf.
459. Id. at 30. When administered alone, the six-question entitlement subscale of the Narcissistic
Personality Inventory “frequently display[s] poor internal reliability.” Joshua B. Grubbs & Julie J. Exline,
Trait Entitlement: A Cognitive-Personality Source of Vulnerability to Psychological Distress, 142
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN 1204, 1206 (2016).
460. Campbell, et. al., supra note 458, at 45 (app B.); see also Grubbs, supra note 459, at 1206
(describing the Psychological Entitlement Scale “as a brief and reliable measure of psychological
entitlement” and stating that “[m]any studies have used the PES as a primary measure of entitlement in
recent years.”).
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disagreement with statements such as (1) “I honestly feel I’m just more
deserving than others;” (2 ) ”[g]reat things should come to me;” (3) “I
demand the best because I’m worth it;” and (4) “[p]eople like me deserve
an extra break now and then.”461 Most likely, testing will disclose that
many, if not most, of the judges abusing their office suffer from an
unjustified sense of entitlement. The jurisdiction’s disciplinary
commission can then order and monitor appropriate “therapeutic
interventions designed to address the demanding and deserving attitudes
that characterize entitlement.”462
V. CONCLUSION
The need to promote public confidence in the judiciary cannot be
overstated. It is the overarching purpose of every code of judicial
conduct.463 Therefore, the legal profession, judiciary, and judicial
disciplinary bodies are obligated to invest their time and resources wisely
to deliver a legal system worthy of the public’s trust. Accordingly, judges
and lawyers should champion confidence-building measures that have a
realistic chance of acceptance by the political branches of government as
well as by the people. It comes as no surprise that the likelihood of the
adoption of a confidence enhancing proposal increases dramatically when
the proposal carries no partisan baggage, has little financial cost, and
implements a universally held principle of law.
Better educating judges on the use of judicial power and prestige,
meaningful discipline of judges who exploit their offices, and identifying
and treating the psychological entitlement that many times triggers
judicial abuses exemplify the type of confidence-building improvements
that should top the profession’s agenda. All too often, lawyers and judges
focus their efforts to improve public confidence on proposals laden with
partisan overtones—proposals which the legal profession has no authority
to implement. The profession’s unabated and fruitless effort to convince
the public to reform judicial selection methods464 is a primary example of
a highly controversial, and in many ways, partisan proposal intended to
increase public trust in the judiciary. Instead, lawyers and judges need to
461. Id.
462. Grubbs, supra note 459, at 1219.
463. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Preamble (Am. Bar. Ass’n 2007) (“Inherent in all
the Rules contained in this Code, are the precepts that judges, individually and collectively, must respect
and honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to maintain and enhance confidence in the legal
system.”).
464. See Alicia Bannon, Rethinking Judicial Selection in State Courts, BRENNAN CENTER FOR
JUSTICE, 17 (2016) (“[N]o state has moved from contested elections to a merit selection system in more
than 30 years.”).
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concentrate on solving an abhorrent, universally recognized problem
totally within their power to eradicate—the misuse of judicial power and
prestige to further the personal interests of the judge and others anointed
by the judge as deserving partial treatment. This article provides a
framework to begin that effort.
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